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Oliver A. Houck *

THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND: THE DARK CANON
OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
ABSTRACT
This article treats four Supreme Court opinions that have had a
lasting impact, largely negative, on public lands and resources.
They rest on highly selective statements of fact, and dubious use of
precedent and statutory law. As a quartet they make the protection
of natural resources extremely difficult, resources that by statute
belong to us all.
The first case, Southern Utah Wilderness Association, opened up
a designated Wilderness Area to off-road vehicle use, where these
uses are explicitly prohibited by law. The second case, Ohio
Forestry, made management plans of the United States Forest
Service, covering over 180 million acres of spectacular beauty,
effectively immune from judicial review . . . no matter how much
these plans violated the mandates of the National Forest
Management Act. The third case, Rapanos, effectively removed
federal protections from large swaths of American wetlands,
opening them up for development and pollution, no matter how
willful or detrimental the action, and in this case no matter how
criminal the actor. The last case, New Mexico v. United States,
held that federal forests have no right to water even for their own
survival, when forest reservation of water was essential to supply
downstream users.
None of these cases made sense in law or in fact. Yet, emerging
from reading them one is struck by how uncomprehending they are
of the science of resource management, and often how biased these
opinions were. In the final analysis, however, this is for the reader
to say.

* Professor of Law and David Boies Chair in Public Interest Law, Tulane University. The research
assistance of Caelyn Radzunius (TLS ‘22)(SUWA), Julie Schwartzwald (TLS ‘21)(Rapanos),
and Rosa Acheson (TLS 21)(New Mexico), is acknowledged with gratitude.
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SOUTHERN UTAH WILDERNESS ALLIANCE:
GOOD BYE WILDERNESS
“And into the forest I go, to lose my mind and find my soul.”
—John Muir 1
1. Beauty and the Beast
The environment of the world is managed in many ways by many countries,
but the most protective and uniquely American is wilderness. Wilderness is defined
by statute as a place “untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does
not remain,” and this concept exists nowhere else in the world. The definition is part
law and part poetry, and it is unsurprising that some think it lunacy to preserve a
landscape simply for the purpose of going there to walk around. And yet, this is what
great number of Americans do.
Where did this idea come from? Wilderness has many roots, starting with
19th century Europeans who had nothing remaining like it back home. Once in
America they were drawn to spectacular panoramas painted by Frederick Remington
and John Moran, the novels of Jack London, the poetry of Robert Service, the essays
of John Muir, and the reports of eastern journalists, all of whom primed the pump
for a wilderness system. Wilderness took root as a government policy in the early
1900s through the work of a young U.S. Forest Service employee, Aldo Leopold. 2
To Leopold, wilderness meant, first and foremost, the absence of motor vehicles.
In an essay called “The River of the Mother of God” he called out the “Great
God Motor” and “that Frankenstein which our boosters have builded [sic], the ‘Good
Roads Movement.’” He continued:
[O]f all the foolish roads the most pleasing (to motorists and
boosters) is the one that “opens up’ some last vestige of virgin
wilderness. With the unholy zeal of fanatics we hunt them out and
place them on his altar, while from the throats of a thousand
luncheon clubs and Chambers of Commerce and Greater Gopher
Prairie Associations rises the solemn chant: “There is No God but
Gasoline and Motor is His Prophet.” 3
Based on this ideology Leopold persuaded the Forest Service to designate a network
of “roadless areas” where the god of gas and cars would not be seen or heard. 4 These

1. GOODREADS, https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/7796963-and-into-the-forest-i-go-to-lose-mymind (last visited July 22, 2021).
2. SUSAN L. FLADER, THINKING LIKE A MOUNTAIN ALDO LEOPOLD AND THE EVOLUTION OF AN
ECOLOGICAL ATTITUDE TOWARD DEER, WOLVES AND FORESTS (1994).
3. PAUL SUTTER, DRIVEN WILD: HOW THE FIGHT AGAINST AUTOMOBILES LAUNCHED THE
MODERN WILDERNESS MOVEMENT 78 (2002).
4. Aldo Leopold, The Last Stand of Wilderness, AMERICAN FORESTS AND FOREST LIFE, Winter
2014,
https://www/americanforests.org/magazine/aldo-leopold-the-last-stand-ofwilderness.html.
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were the first designated wilderness areas in the United States, half a century before
the passage of the Wilderness Act of 1964. 5
Until the early 1960s motorized intrusions into the woods remained limited
to the roads passing through them. They had little effect on the life within. Within a
short decade this would change dramatically. Motorbikes, snowmobiles, and other
all-terrain vehicles (ORVs) could go wherever they wished, no matter how deep,
steep, rocky, or vegetated the terrain, and, as Leopold foresaw, they were drawn to
unspoiled places. They were not simply transportation to remote recreation grounds.
They were the recreation themselves. 6 Their sales boomed, and their uses formed
lobbies funded, inter alia by Chevron, Exxon, Suzuki, Yamaha, Honda, Marathon
Oil, and the American Petroleum Institute. 7 They had but one objective: open federal
lands to all off-road vehicles (ORVs) and keep them that way.
Unfortunately, ORVs could be heard for miles, left the odor of gasoline in
winter valleys, and their treads chewed up streambeds, forest, hiking trails, dunes,
tundra, swamps, and virtually everything else they touched. 8 They were conquerors
of the landscape, and their corporate sponsors and lobbyists had a powerful lock on
federal decision making. At the time of the Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance
(SUWA) lawsuit, an estimated 42 million Americans were driving all-terrain
vehicles. 9 The sales of new ORVs were approaching one million vehicles per year. 10
Conflicts between wilderness and other forest uses were inevitable and led
to a series of laws to reduce them. These laws would come to the Supreme Court in
SUWA. Remarkably, the Court would find that none of them applied.
2. Four Laws
“I hope there is some way we could outlaw all off-road vehicles,
including snowmobiles, motorcycles, etc., which are doing more
damage to our forests and deserts than anything man has ever
created.”
—U.S. Senator Barry Goldwater (Arizona), 1973 11
An executive order and three laws surfaced in the 1970s that would bear on
the case to come. The Presidential Executive Order came first and was followed by
a law that protected Wilderness Study Areas (WSAs) under the Federal Lands
Protection and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). The next law required Land
5. See Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. Sec. 113 et. seq.
6. See Friends of the Earth and Wildlands Center for Preventing Roads, TRAILS OF DESTRUCTION,
19 (1998).
7. See Jerry Spangler, “Some Fear Utah Lands turning into ‘King’s Forest,’” Desert News, July 12,
l988 (listing corporate sponsors of ORV groups); see also TRAILS OF DESTRUCTION, supra
note 6.
8. See George Wuerthner, THRILCRAFT: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF
MOTORIZED RECREATION (2007) (text and graphic photos).
9. Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 60 (2004).
10. Id.
11. DAVID SHERIDAN, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, OFF-ROAD VEHICLES
ON PUBLIC LAND, 51 (1979).
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Management Plans under FLPMA as well, and finally the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) was also designed to soften human impacts on the
environment. Each merits a closer look.
A. Executive Order 11644
In 1972, President Carter issued Executive Order 11644, 12 focused
exclusively on off-road vehicles. Prompted by a report from the Council on
Environmental Quality documenting the abuses of these vehicles, the Order required
all federal agencies to designate areas where ORV use was either appropriate or
inappropriate based on terrain, potential impacts, and the avoidance of user
conflicts. 13 Agencies were to close any area immediately if irreparable harm was
imminent. 14
Most federal agencies took the Executive Order to heart. Last in line,
however, was the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) which managed over 247
million acres of public lands 15 for grazing and mineral development and whose few
employees had little appetite for confronting the ORV lobby.
Two lawsuits illustrate how far the Bureau’s unwillingness to act went, even
when ORV damage was overwhelming. National Wildlife Federation v. Morton 16
examined the BLM’s first attempt to skirt the Executive Order. Faced with the
unwelcome task of closing some areas to ORV use, the Bureau instead declared all
public lands under its jurisdiction to be open to these vehicles, unless and until it
decided to close them. 17 It took the district court only a few sentences to strike the
Bureau’s declaration as a “wholesale” dereliction of duty. 18
The BLM showed the same lack of enthusiasm for resource protection in
Sierra Club v. Clark, involving Dove Canyon within California’s Desert
Conservation Area. 19 In the words of a reviewing court, Dove Canyon was a
“priceless” natural area. 20 It was a highly unusual desert environment, a small stream
surrounded by abundant vegetation and tall dunes sheltering rare birds and other
wildlife. 21 These same qualities made it attractive to visitors and highly vulnerable
to ORV impacts. The vulnerability was not theoretical; ORV users had already torn
up much of the terrain and held weekend rallies running from the dunes to the
water. 22
The Desert Conservation Act spoke to the problem directly, requiring that
whenever the Bureau determines that vehicle use “is causing or will cause”

12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Use of Off-Road Vehicles on the Public Lands, 37 Fed. Reg. 2877 (Feb. 8, 1972).
Id. at § 3(a) (zones), 3(c) (conflicts).
Id. at § 9.
See Bureau of Land Management, Public Lands Statistics (2014).
393 F. Supp. 1286 (D.D.C. 1975).
Id.
Id. at 1292.
756 F.2d. 686 (9th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 687.
Id. at 688 (“over 250 species of plants, 24 species of reptiles, and over 30 species of birds”).
Id. at 688.
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significant harm it “shall immediately” close the area. 23 True to form, however,
BLM’s plan kept open the lion’s share of Dove Springs. Even though the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals saw the situation for what it was—“the virtual sacrifice of
a priceless area in order to accommodate a special recreational activity” 24—it could
not pull the trigger and refused to enjoin the plan.
B. Wilderness Study Areas (WSA)
National Wilderness areas are designated by Congress, 25 with the
acquiescence of the states in which they are found, as a matter of comity.
Anticipating the potential for lag time between a proposal and Congressional action,
FLPMA required the BLM to identify WSAs, pristine environments within its
jurisdiction that were eligible for inclusion in the system. 26 Lest they be damaged in
the interim, these areas were to be managed “so as not to impair the suitability . . .
for preservation as wilderness.” 27 The standard for “impairment” was not
ambiguous. While the notion of significant harm to the desert might have been
debatable in Sierra v. Clark, there was little room for dispute about whether an area
was trammeled by the hand of man.
In Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (SUWA), the Bureau had
dutifully found two million acres to be eligible for wilderness protection, but the state
of Utah disagreed. 28 Instead, several counties were busy bulldozing roads into
potential wilderness areas precisely in order to “trammel” them, making them forever
ineligible for federal protection. 29 This mindset was very much in the background
when the SUWA case came on.
C. Land Use Plans
FLMPA was enacted in 1976 to bring order to the BLM which had virtually
no mission other than to permit mining and let cattle run free. 30 The Act charged the
BLM with preparing land use plans and implementing them accordingly. 31 The plans
were to comply with nine criteria 32 and covered all activities within a BLM district,
including recreational vehicles. The plans were proposed via notice and comment
rulemaking. Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) 33 deviations from
them would require new rulemaking. The land use plans were law. A Bureau plan,
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 689-90.
Id. at 691.
43 U.S.C. § 1782(b).
Id. at 1782(a).
Id. at 1782(c).
542 U.S. 55 at 59.
See Larry Warren, Utah counties bulldoze the BLM, Park Service, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, March
25, 2019 (“A flurry of bulldozing in three southern Utah counties has led to one arrest, federal
lawsuits and miles of improved roadways through wilderness study areas and the Grand
Staircase-Escalante National Monument”).
Federal Land Policy and Mangement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579 90 Stat. 2743; 43 U.S.C.
§ 1701, et seq.
43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (planning), (e) (implementation).
43 U.S.C. § 1712(c).
5 U.S.C. § 553.
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such as the one promulgated in SUWA, was as binding as if it had been enacted by
Congress.
D. National Environmental Policy Act
NEPA 34 was enacted in 1969 with ambitious statutory goals to harmonize
human’s existence with nature. 35 The goals were to be achieved through an
environmental impact statement process 36 reviewing courts enforced with rigor. 37
All agency plans, including the BLM, were subject to this requirement. Federal
regulations under NEPA also required supplemental impact statements whenever an
activity changed from what had been described in the statement, or when the
surrounding circumstances changed. 38 If an agency said it would do A, and it did not
do A, then a supplement was required.
In the SUWA litigation that followed, the Ninth Circuit had little difficulty
understanding and applying the requirements of the four laws. Upon reaching the
Supreme Court, however, Justice Scalia managed to avoid each of these mandates,
even the most specific, with arguments that were both disingenuous and misleading.
3. SUWA goes to court.
“Factory Butte: A striking, menacing sandstone peak towering above
that’s equal parts Mordor and the Moon”
—Tourist information, Torrey Utah 39
In a state famed for its geography, Factory Butte has been characterized as
one of Utah’s lesser-known gems. 40 Photographs of the area are stark and stunning. 41
The largest of several flat-topped mesas topping at over 6,200 feet and, per the local
tourist guide, it seems “deeply entrenched” in the ground, “like a very old rock
stump.” 42 The surrounding landscape is also otherworldly, like exploring “another
planet, and for good reason.” 43 If you go, the guide predicts you’re likely to be the
only one there. 44
Not exactly so. You were more likely to be surrounded by a swarm of offroad vehicles and all that comes with them. Factory Butte was one of the most
popular ORV playgrounds in the region. According to Michael Swenson, who
headed the Utah Shared Access Alliance, “[i]f there were ever a place for cross34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

42 U.S.C. § 4321.
Id. at 4331.
Id. at 4332(2)(C).
See Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v. AEC, 449 F.2d. 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Section
102 duties “must be complied with to the fullest,” id. at 1115).
40 C.F.R. § 1502.9.
“Factory Butte, Torrey Utah,” atlasobscura.com/places/factory-butte.
Id.
See https://www.americansouthwest.net/utah/factory-butte/index.html.
See supra note 39.
Id.
Id.
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country motorized travel, Factory Butte is it.” 45 Perhaps its particular attraction to
ORV users lay in the fact that Factory Butte was indeed remote, strange, and
beautiful. 46
As early as 1982, BLM staff recognized that ORVs were causing “longlasting and visible scars” on the Factory Butte landscape that was “highly-susceptible
to erosion.” 47 Unfortunately, however, the Bureau’s 1982 land use plan left Factory
Butte wide open to cross-country use. It remained open for more than decade, even
after BLM recognized it as wilderness study use, prompting the litigation to come.
The Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance filed suit after the Bureau refused
to: 1) protect Factory Butte as a potential wilderness; 2) honor a pledge in its Land
Use Plan (LUP) to monitor and close Factory Butte if harm appeared; and 3) write a
supplemental impact statement because continuing ORV damage was a significant
new circumstance. These were SUWA’s reasons for bringing the suit and its causes
of action.
The District Court rejected the claims. 48 The Wilderness Study Area claim
failed because the BLM had taken some action to limit ORV use, and due to the
Bureau’s “special expertise and judgement,” had discretion over what action to
take. 49 This seemed particularly so where impairment was not “clear and certain.” 50
To the contrary, partial protection for a WSA is not all the statute requires, and
SUWA’s allegations of harm were not rebutted.
The District Court stumbled equally over the LUP which, although “not
carried out to the letter,” was not a “complete failure” of compliance. 51 Although the
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance had presented “significant evidence” of on-going
ORV damage, the BLM had provided evidence that its steps were making at least
some progress. 52 As above, half a loaf was just fine.
As for the NEPA claim, the District Court relied on agency discretion to
forego a supplemental environmental statement, although circumstances had
changed considerably, for the worse, in the years since the first environmental
statement was prepared. 53 Unfortunately, again, these were the very circumstances
that required a supplement. 54
Case dismissed.

45. See Brian Maffly, “Off-roaders are revved up about Utah’s Factory Butte Reopening,”
https://www.sltrib.com/news/environment/2019/05/24/off-roaders-are-revved-up/.
46. See supra notes 3, 6 and accompanying text.
47. See Brief for Petitioner, Nat. Res. Def. Council v. McCarthy, 993 F.3d 1243, 1247 (10th Cir.
2020) (No. 20-4064) (BLM staff report).
48. S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Babbitt, 2000 WL 33914094 (D. Utah Dec. 22, 2000), rev’d sub nom.
S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Norton, 301 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2002), rev’d, 542 U.S. 55 (2004),
and cert. granted, cause remanded sub nom. Utah Shared Access All. v. S. Utah Wilderness All.,
542 U.S. 917 (2004).
49. Id. at *3.
50. Id. at *4.
51. Id. at *6.
52. Id. at *5.
53. Id. at *9.
54. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(d) (“shall” prepare supplement).
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed across the board. 55 On the WSA
count it returned to basics: the BLM was to manage these areas in a manner not to
impair their suitability for preservation as wilderness. 56 This duty was nondiscretionary. Although the BLM had taken steps to limit ORV use in recent years,
the statute was not satisfied by partial measures. 57 The APA, the reach of which
extended beyond mandamus, required courts to compel actions that were not only
“unlawfully withheld” but also “unreasonably delayed” 58 citing Forest Guardians v.
Babbitt. 59 The Court compelled.
The Ninth Circuit then turned to the BLM’s LUP, which in pertinent part
stated that, “[t]he area will be monitored and closed if warranted.” 60 Congress had
mandated that public lands be managed in accordance with these plans, as did the
BLM’s own regulations (“will adhere to the terms, conditions, and decisions of
resource related plans”). 61 The plan’s commitments to monitor and close land areas,
if warranted, were binding in law. Accordingly, the Court concluded:
We hold that BLM did have a mandatory, nondiscretionary duty
to comply with the Factory Butte LUP’s ORV-monitoring
provision and the San Rafael LUP’s ORV-implementation
provision. We reject BLM’s arguments that (1) LUP’s cannot
impose mandatory, nondiscretionary duties, and/or (2) can only
impose mandatory duties when an affirmative, future, and sitespecific action occurs. And, for reasons previously discussed, we
reject the suggestion that BLM’s efforts towards compliance,
delayed for over a decade, preclude [APA] review. 62
Coming last to NEPA, the Ninth Circuit found a supplemental environmental impact
statement necessary when circumstances had significantly changed, and in this case
the increased ORV activity certainly qualified as a significant change. 63 The District
Court had simply missed ball.
Stepping back, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the BLM had backed
down to the ORV lobby, once again. 64 Whether it would get away with it was now
in the hands of the United States Supreme Court.

55. S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Norton, 301 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2002), rev’d, Norton v. S. Utah
Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 124 S. Ct. 2373, 159 L. Ed. 2d 137 (2004), and cert. granted, cause
remanded sub nom. Utah Shared Access All. v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 917, 124 S. Ct.
2870, 159 L. Ed. 2d 774 (2004).
56. Id. at 1225.
57. Id. at 1230-31.
58. Id. at 1226.
59. 174 F.3d.1178,1187-8 (10th Cir. 1999).
60. See S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Norton, 301 F.3d at 1233.
61. See 43 U.S.C. § 1732 (FLPMA); 40 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(c) (regulations).
62. 301 F.3d at 1236.
63. Id. at 1236-40.
64. This impression is reinforced by the fact that the Utah Shared Access Alliance, Blue Ribbon
Coalition and the Motorcycle Tours intervened in support of the plan, see district court opinion
supra at note 44. In addition the Department of Interior was led by Gail Norton, who had led the
Mountain States Legal Foundation prior to her appointment: Mountain States was funded and by
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4. The Supreme Court Strikes Out.
“ . . . for its one, two, three strikes you’re out at the old, ball
game . . . ”
Justice Scalia took three swings at the law in SUWA and missed every time.
Perhaps recognizing the challenge ahead, he began with a treatise on the APA which
set the opinion off on the wrong foot, from which it never recovered.
SUWA’s lawsuit challenged the BLM’s failure to act on WSAs, LUPs, and
NEPA. 65 As noted above, the APA required courts to compel actions that were
“unlawfully withheld” or “unreasonably delayed.” 66 To Justice Scalia “unlawfully”
meant legal action required within a fixed time, such as a regulation due in six
months, citing the common law principle of mandamus which recognized only
actions “unlawfully withheld.” 67 In so doing Justice Scalia took “unreasonably
delayed” off the table. But he did not stop there.
The purpose of limiting judicial review, Justice Scalia continued, was to
allow agencies to “work out compliance with the broad statutory mandate,” without
“injecting the judge into day-by-day management.” 68 He offered, by way of example,
mandates “to manage wild free-roaming horses and burros in a manner that is
designed to achieve a thriving natural balance,” or to manage a park “to preserve
knowledge and understanding of the history of jazz,” 69 which were hardly relevant
to WSAs. There was a world of difference between a duty to not impair wilderness
values, which fit the APA’s requirement for specificity like a glove, 70 and an
exhortation to achieve a thriving natural balance or the history of jazz, which did not
fit it at all. The first was enforceable. The exhortations were not.
By this point in the opinion the Justice had trashed half of the APA judicial
review scheme, and then, by inapt analogy, declared the non-impairment duty
unenforceable. In so doing he skirted the most clear-cut issue in the litigation—
indeed the whole purpose of the litigation— the protection of wilderness.
Justice Scalia then turned to the BLM’s LUP, 71 which in his view was not
to be a plan at all but, rather, a “statement of priorities.” 72 The Bureau was merely
stating we might do this, we might do that. However, as seen above, FLPMA had
intended a plan to be considerably more. Justice Scalia could not avoid accepting

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

71.
72.

development industries whom they represented in court. See Oliver A. Houck, With Charity for
All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1476-83 (1984).
Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
See discussion supra at n. 55.
542 U.S. at 63. The Court overlooked that the APA had extended judicial review beyond actions
“unlawfully withheld,” see discussion at 301 Fed. at 1226.
542 U.S. at 66-67.
Id. at 67.
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (review of all actions not “committed to agency discretion by law). Courts
have consistently interpreted this phrase to mean those laws sufficiently specific to be
enforceable, see Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S. Ct. 814, 28 L.
Ed. 2d 136 (1971), specificity is the key.
542 U.S. at 71.
Id.
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that the plan indeed was more and included commitments to protective actions. The
Factory Butte area “will be monitored and closed if warranted,” and for San Rafael
that “resource damage will be documented and recommendations made for corrective
action.” 73 The English language could not make these commitments more plain.
Justice Scalia then went to explain that “will” did not mean will, any more
than “plan” had meant plan. 74 That the Bureau stated that it “will take specific
actions,” Scalia declared, is not “a binding commitment in terms of the plan.” 75 Who
knew? The Justice then picked up on an argument raised in the government’s brief:
that implementing the plan was subject to “budget constraints.” 76 Although the plan
made no mention of this qualification, it “must be reasonably implied.” 77 He also
noted that the BLM was developing more specific ORV plans, still in the works,
which to him indicated compliance with their commitments, although they in no way
met the plan’s stated obligations to monitor and close Factory Butte and San Rafael. 78
Once again, half a loaf was fine. Taken together, this discussion reads like a plea of
guilty-with-excuses. As the poet Robert Service wrote over a century ago, “a promise
made is a debt unpaid.” 79 Scalia left it unpaid.
The Court finally reached the NEPA issue in the case, the BLM’s failure to
prepare a supplemental environmental impact statement required when
circumstances had significantly changed. 80 As seen earlier, the district court had
missed the ball on this issue, but the Ninth Circuit found the regulation was clear that
a supplement was required. At which point, the Justice engaged in one last game of
dodgeball.
Justice Scalia accepted SUWA’s argument that significant changes had
happened since the first environmental statement, which would have been hard to
deny. 81 These changes, he went on, might call for a supplement, but the statute no
longer applied. NEPA applied only to major federal actions, and once the plan was
completed there was no federal action left on the table. 82 NEPA was over. Catch-22!
One problem with this argument is that Scalia had earlier described BLM
plans as an open-ended, iterative process. This so, then the major federal action was
continuing and begged for a supplement. Either that, or it begged for a new plan
which would require a new environmental statement altogether. 83

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 68.
Id. at 69.
Id.
Id. at 71.
Id.
Id. at 70-71.
ROBERT W. SERVICE, SONGS OF A SOURDOUGH 57 (6th ed. 1907).
542 U.S. at 72.
Id. at 73.
Id.
Id.
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For the record, however, the Supreme Court had never decided in favor of
NEPA since its advent in 1969. 84 Nor did Justice Scalia ever dissent from the
opinions. No arguments by SUWA were going to change that.
5. Beyond SUWA
‘When I use a word’, Humpty Dumpty said in a rather scornful tone,
‘it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.’
—Humpty Dumpty, Alice in Wonderland 85
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Justice Scalia’s opinion its distortion of
plain English. “Impair” did not mean impair, “plan” did not mean plan, “will” did
not mean will, “require” did not mean require. For these and other reasons, SUWA is
one of the most roundly criticized Supreme Court opinions in America. At least 17
law review articles have been written on it and over 200 more carry its name in the
title, including “Off-roading without a Map,” “Supreme Court Eschews Agency’s
failure to Protect Wilderness in Redrock Country,” and “the Supreme Court Rolls
over the National Environmental Policy Act.” 86 These are not good grades.
Meanwhile—as with the implementation of NEPA itself—lower courts
have picked up the slack and have rejected the highly permissive ORV plans of a
number of federal agencies, and on a number of grounds. For example:
Oregon Natural Desert Association v. Bureau of Land Management 87
invalidated the BLM’s consideration of alternative ORV plans under NEPA. The
Bureau had put forth seven alternatives, each opening more land to vehicle use than
existed before. No alternative reduced them.
Center for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Management 88 struck
down a plan for the Algodones Dunes of the California Desert, most of it opened to
unlimited ORV use. The plan would reopen four of five areas originally closed for
the protection of an endangered plant species. Reopening these areas were projected
to cause a fifty percent decline in the endangered plant species, a violation of both
FLPMA and the Endangered Species Act.
WildEarth Guardians v. Montana Snowmobile Association 89 overruled a
Forest Service plan for failure to consider its impacts on big game winter range
habitat under NEPA, and for violating the impact minimization requirement of
Executive Order 11644.

84. See Richard Lazarus, The National Environmental Policy Act and the U.S. Supreme Court: a
Reappraisal and a Peek Behind the Curtain, 100 GEO. L.J. 1507 (2012) (describing, inter alia,
17 adverse opinions).
85. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE
(HarperCollins 1800).
86. Email from Carla D. Pritchett, Research Librarian, Tulane Law School, to author (Sept. 16, 2020,
9:05 CDT) (on file with author).
87. Oregon Nat’l Desert Ass’n v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 531 F.3d 1114, (9th Cir. 2008).
88. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Bureau of Land Mgt, 422 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
89. WildEarth Guardians v. Montana Snowmobile Ass’n, 790 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2015).
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Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar 90 found a National Park Service decision
to open over 20 miles of ORV trails in Florida’s Big Cypress National Preserve to
have violated the breach of a previous settlement agreement under NEPA, the
National Parks Act’s protection mandate, the Executive Order’s minimization
mandate, and the Endangered Species Act.
Defenders of Wildlife v. National Park Service 91 challenged Park Service
planning allowing several thousand trucks, cars, and dune buggies unlimited access
to the Cape Hatteras National Seashore. At stake were nesting habitats impacting
over 30,000 migratory and endangered shorebirds, many of whose populations were
already declining, in violation of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and the Endangered
Species Act. The case led to a consent decree, and to a countersuit by the Cape
Hatteras Access Preservation Alliance, composed of vehicle owners. This suit led to
another consent decree providing broad areas of protection and access limited in
space and time.
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Marcilyn Burke 92 invalidated BLM
authorization of 4,300 miles of ORV use in a 2.1 million acre area located between
two National Parks and one National Recreation Area, and included the Dirty Devil
Canyon hideout for the infamous Butch Cassidy, and the Henry Mountains and
Factory Butte last seen in Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance. The
violations included failure to mitigate vehicle impacts, and the removal of FLPMA
protections from the Henry Mountains as an Area of Critical Environmental
Concern, apparently “based on political reasons.”
Beaverhead County Commissioners v. U.S. Forest Service 93 concerned a
revised National Forest Plan that reduced ORV use due to resource and wildlife
damage, and banned it in recommended wilderness areas. Although the reductions
were minor in scope, approximately 10 percent of that previously allowed, user
groups and the county sued under FLPMA and NEPA. The court found the plan
reasonable and lawful.
Taken together, these cases indicate that the ORV versus Wilderness
conflict continues, and that, despite the Supreme Court opinion in SUWA, there is
abundant law to apply. While all agencies are involved, the one most prone to violate
the law is, not surprisingly, the one with the least environmental history or statutory
guidance, the Bureau of Land Management. This said, its mandates that it will not
“impair” wilderness values, that it “will” monitor and protect, that it “shall” prepare
a supplemental environmental statement are not ambiguous at all. Unless, of course,
a Supreme Court Justice wants them to be. Which of course puts him in league with
Humpty Dumpty.

90. Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 877 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
91. Defenders of Wildlife v Salazar, 877 F. Supp. 2d 1271 (2012). See also Testimony of Derb Carter,
Southern Environmental Law Center on behalf of the National Audubon Society, Defenders of
Wildlife and the Wilderness Society before the National Parks Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources on off-road vehicle use in the Cape May National
Seashore, North Carolina, July 30, 2008.” Carter represented environmental organizations in this
lawsuit up to and including the consent decree.
92. S. Utah Wilderness All. v. Burke, 981 F. Supp. 2d 1099 (D. Utah 2013).
93. Beaverhead Cnty. Comm’rs v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. CV 1O-68-BU-SEH (D. Mont. July 22,
2013) (ELR 20164).
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OHIO FORESTRY: LOSING THE FORESTS FOR THE TREES
“The days have ended when the forest may be viewed only as trees
and trees viewed only as timber. The soil and water, the grasses and
the shrubs, the fish and the wildlife, and the beauty that is the forest
must become integral parts of resource managers’ thinking and
actions.” 94
—Senator Hubert Humphrey, 1976, on the National Forest
Management Act
The Wayne National Forest of central Ohio was perhaps the least likely
place in the country for a collision over forest planning. It was assembled in the
1930s from cut-over woodlots, abandoned mine sites and failing farmland, and
remains fragmented by private lands even now. 95 One could walk across parts of it
in a day. It was nonetheless the largest public forest, and the only national forest, in
the state. 96 Featuring a canopy of second-growth hardwoods and slow-growing trees,
it held only three percent of Ohio’s timber and produced less than one percent of its
harvest. 97 On the other hand, it was an easy drive from Columbus and its potential
for recreation, wildlife (even its own endangered species), 98 and perhaps even a
moment of solitude, was significant. There were no lands of its size and diversity
from Toledo, on Lake Erie, to the Kentucky border. Which is why the Sierra Club
would sue.
Despite these attributes, in 1988, the U.S. Forest Service management plan
for the Wayne Forest declared nearly three-quarters of it suitable for timbering, with
some 80 percent by clear-cutting. 99 The practice was cheap and convenient. Even
cheaper if the general public paid much of the tab. It could also be devastating to
landscapes and watersheds, particularly those ill-suited for timbering at all. 100 This
was at the heart of a federal law designed to curb it, and the litigation that followed.

94. 122 Cong. Rec. 5619 (1976) (remarks of Senator Humphrey).
95. MICHAEL MANGUS & JENNIFER HERMAN, OHIO ENCYCLOPEDIA 570 (2008-2009 ed. 2008); see
also Wayne National Forest, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. http://www.fs.fed.us/r9/wayne (last visited
Sept 30, 2021) (providing further information about the Forest).
96. See Wayne National Forest, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. http://www.fs.fed.us/r9/wayne (last visited
Sept 30, 2021).
97. DIV. OF FORESTRY, OHIO DEP’T. OF NAT. RES, OHIO: THE MANY SIDES OF THE FOREST
ECONOMY 8 (2006).
98. Wayne National Forest, WIKITRAVEL, https://wikitravel.org/en/Wayne_National_Forest (last
visited July 26, 2021) (the Forest hosts “more than 2,000 species of plants,” one of them
endangered, the “running buffalo clover.”).
99. Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 248, 249 (6th Cir. 1997).
100. Critics of clearcutting abound, including the founding father and first Chief of the Forest Service,
Gifford Pinchot, who came to view the practice as both unnecessary and unreasonably damaging
to forest resources. See CHAR MILLER, GIFFORD PINCHOT AND THE MAKING OF MODERN
ENVIRONMENTALISM 287, 358-9, 367-92 (2001). By then, however, it was too late to change the
agency’s culture or the direction of the train.
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The Sierra Club appealed the plan to the Forest Service Chief and,
unsurprisingly, lost. 101 It then appealed to a federal district court and lost again. 102 It
then appealed to the Sixth Circuit and won, 103 at which point, at the request of the
Ohio timber industry, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In the decision that followed the Court managed to overlook what Congress
had plainly intended and required of forest management plans, and the nature of the
allegations at play. Instead, without considering the merits, the Court held the matter
was not ripe for review. 104
1. The US Forest Service and the Long Road Toward Law
“The American has but one thought about a tree, and that is to cut it
down”
—President Theodore Roosevelt
Federal forest management had been in turmoil from day one, indeed well
before day one, when there was no such thing as management and the timber industry
ran wild from the Appalachians to the Pacific. In the process, no fewer than seven
towns and cities declared themselves to be “the lumber capitol of the world” and
rightly so, until the lumber ran out. 105 One operator in West Virginia took down the
largest stand of climax red spruce on Earth, some three billion board feet, in less than
a decade. 106 He later boasted that “we didn’t leave a stick standing.” 107 By the mid
1800s federal land surveyors were urging the government to auction off the public
forests remaining “while there was something of value left to sell.” 108 Timber ruled.
Then came two unheralded presidents of the United States, followed by a heralded
one, and everything changed.
In late 1891 the Secretary of Interior, with forest slaughter in mind, tucked
a brief, undebated provision into a public lands appropriations bill authorizing the
President to “set apart” public lands “wholly or in part covered by timber or
undergrowth . . . whether of commercial value or not.” 109 Within a month President
Harrison set apart 13 million acres. 110 A few years later Grover Cleveland set aside

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

106.
107.
108.

109.
110.

Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. 485, 489 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
Id. at 503.
Sierra Club, 105 F.3d at 252.
Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 739 (1998).
STUART L. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS 56 (1963). Udall served three terms in Congress as a
representing Arizona, and then from 1961-1969 as Secretary of Interior. The history cited has
become a classic in the field of natural resources.
Jack Waugh, Lumbering Before Pinchot, AMERICAN HERITAGE, at 91, 96 (Feb./Mar. 1991),
https://www.americanheritage.com/lumbering-pinchot.
Id.
T. H. Watkins, Father of the Forests, AMERICAN HERITAGE, at 86, 90, (Feb./Mar. 1991),
https://www.americanheritage.com/father-forests (detailing the history of Gifford Pinchot and
the U.S. Forest Service).
Creative Act of 1891, Act of 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat., 1995, 1103.
Udall, supra note 105 at 101.
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double that amount, which also proved to be a prelude. 111 Enter Theodore Roosevelt,
whose distaste for the timber industry, 112 brought him in open conflict with the
resource barons of his day, 113 and alliance with Gifford Pinchot, the first chief of the
Forest Service, are things of legend. 114 By the time these two men were done
withdrawing lands under the 1891 Bill they had raised the federal inventory to 132
million acres, the base of the national forests today. 115 Now, they needed a manager.
In 1897, Congress passed the Forest Organic Act authorizing the
Department of Interior to regulate forest uses, a responsibility soon transferred to the
Department of Agriculture . . . and under Pinchot’s direction. Pinchot believed that
“to grow trees as a crop was forestry.” 116 “Forestry,” he assured Congress, “was a
paying proposition”; “we recommend no cutting that does not pay its way.” 117
The Forest Service developed into a high-morale outfit equally committed
to sustained yield principles and a system of management that would frame the
planning processes that followed. 118 The hallmark of this planning was complete
agency discretion. They were the experts. They knew trees. They made the tree
decisions. 119 Their sense of mission and institutional pride were symbolized by
military style uniforms, campaign hats, the ever-wise Smokey Bear, appearances
with Lassie on television, and the lantern-jawed, pipe-smoking, ever-kind ranger
Mark Trail, projecting a lasting image of competence and rectitude. 120 This image,
too, is at the base of what we have today, and helps explain the deference the Service
has enjoyed in all circles, even as it was taken over by a much more aggressive and
single-minded program: clear-cutting.
Clear-cutting as a harvest technique made its debut during World War II to
support the war effort, and tripled annual production to over three billion board feet
in three years. 121 Driven by the post-war boom in housing and paper products, the
cut topped 13 billion by 1970 and remained steady to the time of the Sierra Club

111. Id.
112. Watkins, supra note 108, at 91.
113. The Life of Theodore Roosevelt, NAT’L PARK SERV., https://www.nps.govet/thri/
Theodorerooseveltbio.htm (last updated Oct. 9, 2014).
114. See Watkins, supra note 108; TIMOTHY EGAN, THE BIG BURN: TEDDY ROOSEVELT AND THE FIRE
THAT SAVED AMERICA (2009) (describing Roosevelt, Pinchot and early U.S. Forest Service).
115. Udall, supra note 105, at 105.
116. CHARLES F WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE FUTURE OF
THE WEST 129 (1992).
117. Robert Wolf, Promises to Keep, THE ENV’T F., 10 (1990) (emphasis supplied). Wolf was a lead
negotiator and drafter of the subsequent National Forest Management Act of 1976. Id.
118. Id. at 19-29.
119. Pinchot set the mold by his own Alpha personality, and his almost immediate circumvention of
the Organic Act’s restrictions on timber harvesting (“dead, mature or large growth of trees”),
releasing all timber “which can be cut safely and for which there is a need”). Id. at 54 and n.272.
120. The Service’s image also received a boost early on with its near-heroic efforts to curb the largest,
multi-state fire in America, to the gratitude of local towns and the acclaim of the press. See
TIMOTHY EGAN, THE BIG BURN (2009). It also gave the Service a secondary mission, the
suppression of fire, that has had unfortunate consequences since. Id.
121. Wolf, supra note 117, at 10.
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lawsuit. 122 Private forests, taken together, were larger producers, but federal timber
was less expensive and available, by statute, for the taking.
The economics were warped in its favor. Timber sales were highly
subsidized by American taxpayers, its access roads, reforestation, and other costs
were subsumed in the agency’s annual budget. 123 Sale prices were based not at
market rates but, rather, by cost-plus arrangements guaranteeing a 15 percent profit,
which tended to disrupt private markets as well. 124 Like public utilities, private
timber companies could not lose. Sale revenues, meanwhile, went directly into the
Service’s account, a financial incentive that made it, in the words of Ninth Circuit
Judge Noonan: “a paid accomplice of the loggers.” 125 Theirs was a marriage of
convenience, and the spree was on. By the 1980s seven of ten forest regions were
losing money on timber. 126 Over the next decade the program lost $3.1 billion, more
than $10 billion today. 127 As the resource economist Randall O’Toole put the matter,
“how could the Forest Service act so irresponsibly?” and then answered, “it gets paid
to.” 128
Two early attempts to check the parade were made in the 1960s with the
Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act 1960 (MUSY) 129 and the grandly-named Forest
Rangeland and Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (RPA). 130 Neither
worked. Although the MUSY Act required “balanced and diverse resource uses” that
did not “necessarily provide the greatest economic return” and prohibited
“permanent impairment” of the environment, 131 reviewing courts essentially ignored
it. 132 One court approved the logging of 99.4 percent of viable timber on the Tongass
National Forest of Alaska, more than 4,500,000 acres. The .06 percent reserved for

122. Wilkinson, supra note 117, at 340 n.23.
123. See Oliver A. Houck, The Water, the Trees, and the Land: Three Nearly Forgotten Cases That
Changed the American Landscape, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2279, 2294 n.84 (1996) (citing Taxpayers
Take a Beating in Forest Service Sales, NRDC NEWSL. (Nat. Resources Def. Council, New York,
N.Y.), 1976, at 3) (detailing federally assumed costs for inter alia planning, road access and
restoration); Paul Roberts, Zero Cut, SEATTLE WEEKLY, Nov. 4, 1992, at 12. When these public
expenditures were included for timber sales in 1997, total costs rose from $15 million to $88.6
million. See Curt Anderson, Millions Lost in U.S. Timber Sales, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May, 1998.
124. Roberts, supra note 123, at 28-29; Houck, supra note 123, at 2294 n.84.
125. Sierra Club Legacy v. Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1026 (9th Cir. 2009) (Noonan, J., concurring).
126. New Forest Service Management Scheme Proposed by Conservation Advocates, LAND LETTER
(The Conservation Fund, Arlington, Va.), Aug. 15, 1985, at 3, tbl.3. The only Regions in the
black were the Pacific Northwest, Southern (marginally), and California; Alaska, by contrast, was
losing 99 cents on the dollar. Id.
127. Wolf, supra note 117, at 10; See also Forest Service Loses $88 Million, WEEKLY WASTEBASKET,
(Jun 22, 1998), https://www.taxpayer.net/article/forest-service-loses-88-million/.
128. See Roberts, supra note 123.
129. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (2021).
130. See 16 U.S.C.A §§ 1601-1614 (2018).
131. 16 U.S.C.A § 531(a) (2021).
132. See Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 806-7 (9th Cir.1979) (Act’s “so-called” standards “breathe
discretion in every pore”) (quoting Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1975)).
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other uses was, apparently, “multiple” enough. 133 MUSY became notorious for its
failure to offset or even mitigate commodity uses, it was simply out-gunned. 134
The RPA, for its part, was irrelevant almost by design. Its scheme called for
national 50-year timber targets with revisions every few years, which Service regions
were then required to meet. 135 Hauntingly similar to the Soviet Union’s production
quotas of the same era. Far from checking clear-cutting, the RPA did exactly the
opposite.
The story would end here, but for the unexpected decision of a federal court
in 1973 concerning the Monongahela National Forest of West Virginia that stopped
clear-cutting in its tracks. 136 The rampage here was particularly shocking. 137 Nothing
was left alive. The language of the 1897 Organic Act, the Court discovered, spoke
of harvesting “dead, matured or large growth of trees,” to be “marked and designated
in advance,” and “cut and removed under supervision” of a Service employee. 138
These restrictions were the antithesis of clear-cutting, and of what had been going on
uninterrupted for decades. For this reason alone, the industry could not believe the
decision. It appealed, and to its great surprise it lost. 139 Worse yet, it lost again in
Alaska where a federal court ruled the same way. 140 Suddenly, the default position
on forest management had flipped. Clear-cutting was out . . . unless Congress acted.
The industry and the Service had to come to table, but they came armed for bear.
2. The Law and the Service
After a year of intense bargaining, the National Forest Management Act of
1976 (NFMA) emerged. 141 The debate featured a three-way mano-a-mano among
timber interests (“clearcuts benefit us all”), the Service (“trust us, we are the
133. See Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 122-128 (D. Alaska 1971).
134. See Michael C. Blumm, Public Choice Theory and the Public Lands: Why “Multiple Use”
Failed, 18 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 405, 406-8 (1994).
135. See GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS ET AL., FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCE LAW 658-60
(7th ed. 2014). RPA goals have, further, been found to be unenforceable. Id.
136. W. Va. Div. of Izaak Walton League, Inc. v. Butz, 367 F. Supp. 422 (N.D.W.Va.1973), aff’d,
522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975).
137. One public member of a state forest commission reported visiting the site of a clear-cut and seeing
“hundreds” of other, unwanted tree species, some “rising to the heavens,” “girdled” by the loggers
and left to die. Frederico Cheever, Four Failed Forest Standards: What We Can Learn from the
History of National Forest Management Act’s Substantive Timber Management Provisions, 77
ORE. L. REV. 601, 626 (1998) [hereinafter Cheever] (citing testimony from United States Senate
Hearings preceding the National Forest Management Act of 1976).
138. Izaak Walton League, 367 F. Supp. at 434, n.1. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 476 (repealed 1976)) (“dead,
mature or large growth” . . . “[s]uch timber, before being sold, shall be marked and designated,
and cut and removed under the supervision” of a Department appointee).
139. See supra note 42.
140. Zieske v. Butz, 406 F. Supp. 258 (D. Alaska 1975) (finding that “[A] permanent injunction should
issue barring the cutting of trees other than those which are large physiologically matured, or
dead and requiring such trees to be individually marked prior to cutting.).
141. National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949; for the intensity
see CHARLES F. WILKINSON AND H. MICHAEL ANDERSON, LAND & RESOURCE PLANNING IN THE
NATIONAL FORESTS 40 (1987) (“a bitterly-contested referendum on Forest Service timber
harvesting practices”); For a fuller legislative history see generally id.; See also Cheever, supra
note 137, at 602.
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experts”), and conservationists of all stripes (“trusting them is what got us here”).
Several Senate leaders were central to the final bill, but one pole was represented by
Senator Randolph of West Virginia, whose constituents wanted outright bans on
clearcutting in areas like the Monongahela and a fixed-acreage ceiling on them
everywhere. 142 At the other pole was Senator Humphrey of Minnesota, a significant
timber-producing state remained more under the spell of professional forestry and
sought to leave these decisions to the experts under “prescriptions” assuring less
production-oriented decisions in the future. 143
Given his options, the Service Chief, sitting in on the Senate negotiations,
quickly agreed with Humphrey and had sufficient clout to minimize the proposed
prescriptions, the Senators often asking him, “[c]an you live with that, Chief?” The
deal done, Humphrey had no hesitation in announcing that “the soil, water, shrubs,
fish and wildlife and the beauty of the forests” would become “integral” to resource
thinking. 144 Sadly, he seems to have believed it. Those days, however, would take a
long time to come. Longer still, following Ohio Forestry.
The new engine of NFMA was the management plan. 145 The Senate
compromise dropped the proposed bans and fixed ceilings on clearcutting operations
in favor of plans with strict planning standards designed to steer forest decisions
away from clearcutting at all. 146 The Senate leadership still did not trust the Service,
and intended this process to work. 147 Plans were to come at the beginning of forest
decision making, subject to full APA rulemaking, and were in all senses final until
formally amended. NFMA required the Service to insure that the plans would meet
the standards, and that all following decisions would conform. They were law. They
would not just guide Service actions. They were to control them.
Of the new NFMA standards, three were germane to the Wayne Forest
litigation.
The first, Section 6(k), following an old Pinchot principle, created a frontend process to determine and eliminate certain forest areas from consideration for
harvesting altogether. 148 “In developing land management plans,” it begins, “the
Secretary shall identify lands within the management area which are not suited for
timber production, considering physical, economic and other pertinent factors to the
extent feasible, as determined by the Secretary.” 149 Only an “idiot forester,” it was
explained, would take down these trees. 150
The legislative history of this provision shows the primary concern to have
been economic, resolving the chronic below-cost sale problem and the ensuing
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 141, at 40-42; see Wolf, supra note 117, at 10-12.
See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 141, at 69-70.
Id. at 70.
National Forest Management Act of 1976 §§ 6, 13.
WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 141, at 70-71.
The legislative history is replete with remarks, save those of Humphrey, highly critical of the
Service and demanding either bans or tight restrictions on clearcutting, see Id. at 41, 42; See also
Wolf, supra note 118, at 11 (naming Senators Talmadge, Randolph, and Church as major players
in this process).
148. National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, § 6(K), 90 Stat. 2949.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. Wolf, supra note 117 (emphasis supplied).
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deficit. 151 It was to exclude even marginally-economical lands, “where the costs of
special measures to avoid environmental damage or assure regeneration were so
high that the activity was imprudent and relatively uneconomic.” 152 Section 6(k) was
not an absolute cost/benefit test, but as close as one might come to it. 153
Unequivocally, it was intended to come at the front end and focus on topography and
costs, including those for mitigation and restoration.
Secondly, Section 6(g)(3)(F) established a double presumption against
clear-cutting itself, and a protective shield. The Service would insure that
clearcutting will be used only where: “it is determined to be the optimum method . . .
to meet the objectives” of the management plan, and such cuts are consistent with
“the protection of soil, watershed, fish, wildlife, recreation, and esthetic resources,
and the regeneration of timber resources.” 154
A third provision, Section 6(g)(3)(E), imposed specific requirements for all
harvest methods with the same double burdens to, inter alia, ensure that timber will
be harvested only where: “soil, slope, or other watershed conditions will not be
irreversibly damaged,” and “there is assurance that such lands can be adequately
restocked within five years after harvest.” 155 Clearly, the Congress meant business.
The Service ostensibly welcomed the Act, and then went about trying to
ensure instead that it not get in the way. It began by describing its land management
plans as “programmatic” with the specifics to come at the end of the process when
particular tracts were put up for sale. 156 Plan provisions were said to “guide” future
decisions, not actionable decisions themselves. 157 Under these interpretations,
review of a plan’s methods and contents would be, by definition, premature. By no
coincidence the Service would be taking the same position with respect to
environmental impact statements, deferring their preparation to the time of particular
sales when more specific information was known. 158 In both cases it was review151. See generally id.
152. See WILKINSON & ANDERSON, supra note 141, at 162, (quoting a Senate committee report
interpreting the Church guidelines, which became the template for NFMA and Section 5(k) in
particular).
153. See id. at 162-170 (describing a muddy resolution that included, at the suggestion of the Forest
Chief, such non-monetary factors as wildlife habitat improvement); See Ohio
Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 10 (1998) (opening the door in Ohio Forestry to
claims that below-cost clear-cuts could be justified by “wildlife benefits” such as deer hunting).
154. National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, § 6(g)(3)(F), 90 Stat. 2949
(emphasis added).
155. See National Forest Management Act of 1976 § 6(g)(3)(E) at 2954 (emphasis added); Sadly, this
five-year requirement, the only fixed number in NFMA, became twisted out of meaning by
subsequent Service policy, see Tuholske & Brennan, infra note 161 at 83-4.
156. See Brief for Federal Respondents, at 2, Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1997)
(No. 97-16), 1997 WL 7722731 (citing Service plans under 36 C.F.R. § 219.1(a) as providing
“overall programmatic guidance”) (quoting the Service Chief “under established Forest Service
Practices, including determinations on the appropriateness of even-age management and the
optimality of clearcutting, must be made and documented during Forest Plan implementation on
a project-by-project basis”); id. at 8.
157. 36 C.F.R. § 219.1(b) (2012) (plans to “guide” management activities).
158. See The Planning Rule Proposal: Enviros Consider Litigation Against FS Planning Rule
(unpublished land letter) (undated) (on file with author) (stating rules remove long-standing
requirement for impact statements on forest plans); see also Nathaniel S. W. Lawrence, A Forest
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avoidance, ostensibly for purposes of more informed decisions but not coincidentally
with the equal effect of avoiding public inquiry into the most important decisions to
be made—what, where, and how—and of loading subsequent decisions with the
weight of the plan behind them and administrative steps towards the sales. Such a
flaccid, rear-end role for plans was hardly what Congress had in mind. The Service
had stood NFMA on its ear.
Well before the Ohio Forestry litigation was launched the Service had
started manipulating each one of NFMA’s curbs on clear-cutting, starting with the
requirement that it be used only when “essential,” reduced to “optimal,” reduced
again to “suitable.” 159 At the same time up-front Section 6(k) unsuitability decisions
became subsumed by the soil, slope, and restoration requirements of another section,
reading much of Section 6(k) out of the statute. 160 Restoration itself would require
only the theoretical possibility of success. So much for NFMA’s requirement of
“assurance.” Its five year timeline, furthermore, would start tolling only after the
final tree was felled. 161 All of these maneuvers and more were challenged in a series
of lawsuits, primarily by the Sierra Club, in which several courts simply deferred to
the Service’s expertise, which apparently included warping statutory requirements,
while others peeked behind the curtain and saw the shenanigans at play. 162 None of
these decisions, however, treated the Section 6(k) unsuitability provision directly,
and several rejected the postponement of judicial review until the too-late-to-makea-difference time of a specific timber sale, one court reasoning, “[A] future challenge
to a particular site-specific action would lose much force once the overall plan has
been approved—especially if the challenge were premised on the view that the
overall plan grew out of erroneous assumptions.” 163
Then came the Wayne Forest plan.
3. The Lawsuit and the Decisions Below
The Sierra Club’s complaint laid out the relevant facts succinctly. The
Wayne Forest lands were “characterized by narrow ridge tops, steep slopes and
narrow valleys,” making much of it unsuitable for logging and, in particular, clearcutting. 164 Beyond the land-stripping impacts of this method of logging, it also
required access roads for heavy machinery, in this case some 15 miles of new roads
a year, for the next decade. 165 The forest itself comprised “24 percent of public land

159.

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

of Objections: The Effort to Drop NEPA Review for National Forest Management Act Plans, 39
ENV. L. REP. 10651 (2009).
See generally Cheever, supra note 137 (discussing in full these and related issues); see also
generally Jack Tuholske & Beth Brennan, The National Forest Management Act: Judicial
Interpretation of a Substantive Environmental Statute, 15 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. 53 (1994)
[hereinafter Tuholske & Brennan].
See generally Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 159.
Id.
Id.
Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1519 (9th Cir 1992); see also Tuholske
& Brennan, supra note 159, at 116-17 (discussing similar holdings).
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 14, Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp.
485 (S.D. Ohio 1994) No. C2-92-249.
Id. at 19.
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with wildlife value in the entire state.” 166 They were, further, “a substantial portion
of the state’s old growth inventory” 167 which provided habitat for “numerous plant
and animal species” rare in southeastern Ohio, 168 and for equally rare low-impact
recreation as well. 169 The plan itself admitted that there was, “a low probability of
experiencing isolation from the sights and sounds of people, independence, closeness
to nature, and tranquility.” 170 By contrast, cut-over landscapes and species favoring
them were ample in the region, principally white-tailed deer that were a major feature
of the plan.
As for economics, the Wayne Forest had been losing money on timber sales
for years. From 1987 to 1990 (projected), its revenues were sequentially 67 percent
of costs in 1987, 72 percent in 1988, 78 percent, in 1989, and 74 percent in 1990. 171
The American public, not the timber companies, picked up the rest, in effect
subsidizing a practice that NFMA sought to curb, apparently in order to increase
game species favored by hunters. 172
The Sierra Club alleged several violations of law, beginning with the
determination that clear-cutting was the optimal method of timbering in the Wayne
Forest, notwithstanding NFMA’s legislative history and anti-clearcutting
presumptions. It also claimed that the plan’s admittedly below-cost sales violated the
“unsuitability” provision of Section 6(k) on its face, 173 and by opening up areas that
could theoretically be restored by mitigation or technological measures, without
stating what those measures were or what their costs would be. 174 It lastly claimed
that clear-cutting on this landscape could not help but violate the “irreversible” harm
and “restoration” standards of Section 6(g)(3)(e). In sum, the plan’s economic,
optimal method, and impact determinations were based on faulty policy, and areas
that should not have been made available for clearcutting were given the green light
instead. To the Sierra Club, the time for challenging a plan so flawed in its methods
and conclusions was now, before the train left the station. Noteworthy, in light of the
Supreme Court opinion to come, both courts below found these challenges ripe for
review.
The district court went straight to the merits, accepting the Services
characterization of forest plans as merely “programmatic guidance” that allowed
deferral of key NFMA decisions to a later date. 175 On the issue of optimality for
clear-cutting, intended to be a specific check on clear-cutting, the court found the
166.
167.
168.
169.

170.
171.
172.

173.
174.
175.

Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 33; see also Brief for Respondents at 1, Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, No. 9716 (6th Cir. Jan. 16, 1998), 1998 WL 35182 (citing “undervalued wilderness recreation,” and the
“ability to enjoy undisturbed back country recreation”).
See Brief of Respondents, supra note 169 at 10 (quoting Wayne Forest Plan); see also id. at 9.
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 164, at 22.
See Brief for Respondents, supra note 168, at 10 (“the plan . . . calls for such logging as a way to
generate additional foraging habitat for game species and thereby promote hunting.”) (citation
omitted).
See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 164, at 23.
See Sierra Club v. Robertson, 845 F. Supp. 485, 495 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
Id. at 491 (“programmatic in nature . . . Implementation . . . occurs at a second stage when
individual site-specific projects are proposed and assessed.”).
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Service governed by multiple-use principles that allowed it to choose whatever kind
of forest it wanted, open patches and fast regrowth in this case, and then the preferred
and most efficient way to provide it, 176 all of which made clear-cuts inevitable.
Optimal turned out to be the best way to do whatever the Service decided to do.
As for the need to avoid serious environmental harm, the court embraced
the Service’s favorable view of clearcutting that it, “imitates nature,” 177 “greatly
increases wildlife capacity,” 178 and keeps “impacts on soil and water within fully
acceptable limits.” 179 It further embraced the Service’s grim view of mature tree
stands as, “a dark, high canopy forest in which only shade tolerant species can
survive,” and in which, “valuable hardwood timber rots on the stump or on the
ground.” 180 Who could want that? Congress must have been wrong about
clearcutting after all.
Turning to Section 6(k)’s restrictions, the court found no need to identify
what mitigation or restoration measures would apply, much less be proven, much
less priced in determining what lands should be excluding from harvest. 181 So much
for the economic history of this provision, and its text. The forest management plan,
NFMA’s intended vehicle for change, was returned to the days of discretion.
Case closed.
The Sixth Circuit saw a quite different picture. It addressed ripeness
directly, finding that forest plans, “represent specific and final decisions.” 182 If
challenges to them could be made “only at the time of site-specific” projects, it
continued, the plan itself might “forever escape review.” 183 Reaching the merits, the
Court found the Wayne Forest plan “improperly predisposed” towards
clearcutting. 184 The Service’s high praise for clear-cutting that buttressed its
optimum finding was seriously flawed as a factual matter, 185 and flouted NFMA’s
presumptions that clearcutting be used “only in exceptional cases” and where
consistent with environmental protection. 186 A plan that opened most of the Wayne

176. Id. at 490-92. (“The selection of the appropriate system and harvest method depends on the
judgment of the forest planner, taking into consideration . . . the goals of the forest plan”); Id. at
490.
177. Id. at 492-93 (“this harvesting method [clearcutting] does, in fact, imitate nature. Natural
clearcutting occurs as a result of wildfire, wind, insects and disease.”) (emphasis added).
178. Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 491 (emphasis added) (quoting unrelated study in FEIS that “research has repeatedly shown
the effect of clearcutting on soil and water quality is normally within fully acceptable limits”).
Who knew?
180. Id. at 493 (emphasis added).
181. See id. at 495-99, inter alia finding that since forest plans were governed by multiple use, adding
unquantified wildlife benefits to (considerably) below-cost sales was appropriate, and that the
technology and its costs to ensure against irreversible damage to soils or watershed conditions
under § 6(g)(3)(F) were irrelevant to the 6(k) decision because they had not been determined yet.
So much for the intended “weeding out” purpose of § 6(k).
182. Sierra Club v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 248 at 250.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 251.
185. See id. at 250-251 (findings on recreation and diversity).
186. Id. at 251.
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National Forest to timber harvest, and 80 percent of that to clear-cutting, was upside
down. Case remanded.
4.The Supreme Court Takes a Pass
The Supreme Court took yet a different tack. It began by describing NFMA
as a multiple-use statute and its management plans as “guides” 187 and “decision
tools” 188 citing neither the statute nor its legislative history but rather the Service’s
own, patently self-serving, regulations. 189 It quoted likewise from Service
administrative rulings that declared forest plans to be “programmatic in nature,” as
if they added credibility. This said, the Court did recognize the Sierra complaint as
challenging the policies behind basic issues of the Wayne Forest plan, 190 opening
areas for clear-cutting that were neither optimal, suitable, nor restorable, but then
killed the chance to prove it. Instead, the justices found the matter not ripe for review,
relying in part on the fact, (of all things), that Congress had not provided for citizen
suits. 191
Case dismissed.
The concept of ripeness is judge-made. It is said to prevent courts from
entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies, and to
protect agencies from judicial interference until a decision has been felt in a concrete
way. 192 Just what was “abstract” and “interference” remained to be seen. For this
purpose the Court identified three inquiries whether the: 1) delay would “cause
hardship” to plaintiffs; 2) review at this juncture would “inappropriately interfere”
with agency decision making; and 3) delay, in turn, would produce additional facts
to aid courts in ruling on the merits. 193 All of which were by this time hornbook law.
Unfortunately, there was less law here than met the eye.
Something like the doctrine of standing, ripeness has been described as an
“enigma of administrative law.” 194 As Yale Professor Brian Murchison writes:
“appellate panels ‘divide passionately over whether cases are ripe,’ lawyers ‘uneasily
distinguish ripeness from other threshold issues,’ and students ‘puzzle over’ its
impact on the ‘accountability of public officials.’” 195 The subjectivity of its factors
have proven to be “more of a riddle than a guide, a vocabulary instead of a
charter.” 196 Worse, Murchison continues, while purporting to, “forego ‘complicated
legal distinctions’ divorced from reality,” it, “often produces judicial opinions whose
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

195.
196.

523 U.S. at 729.
Id. at 737.
See id. at 735.
Id. at 731 (“erroneous analysis”).
See id. at 737.
Id. at 732-33 (citing Abbot Laboratories v. Garner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-149 (1967) (finding
regulation ripe for review)).
Id. at 733.
Brian C. Murchison, On Ripeness and “Pragmatism” in Administrative Law, 41 ADMIN. L. REV.
159 (1989); For the Supreme Court’s equally muddled test for standing, see Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), a 5-4 decision in which the two opinions disagreed over the
application of every factor of the test.
Murchison, supra note 194, at 159.
Id. at 160.
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connection to reality is at best unclear.” 197 When it came to this connection no better
example might be found than the disposition, without trial, of Ohio Forestry. The
Court never saw the reality of forest planning at all.
Starting with the hardship question, the Court found that the plan did not
create “legal harm.” 198 It did not grant or withhold any legal power. No one, by virtue
of the plan alone, could start cutting trees, but of course at that point ripeness is
beyond obvious. What is more germane to this case—and to a wider range of
arbitrary decisions that act in similarly irreversible ways—is a possibility the Court
would then accept, without enthusiasm, in theory but fail to apply.
Instead, in its next breath the Court found the plan did not inflict significant
practical harm either. To be sure, it admitted, it would be easier and cheaper for
Sierra to sue now, rather than pursue, “many challenges to each site specific logging
decision,” but such harm was insufficient. 199 The ripeness doctrine itself, the Court
reasoned, presupposes such “inconveniences,” citing Lujan v. National Wildlife
Federation which did not rule on ripeness at all. 200 Besides, it opined, if Sierra
successfully challenged one sale, it could also raise the same plan failure in a
challenge to another sale, if imminent, and receive its day in court. 201
The shortcomings of this analysis leap from the page: Let us count the ways:
(1) The first was to ignore the effect of a plan that, even called a program,
does far more than guide the next steps. As a legal matter it controls them, 202
including here areas of a forest, allegedly improperly, declared optimal for clearcutting, and more importantly those not declared unsuitable for economic, physical
and other reasons. These are a highly-structured form of zoning decisions, and public
challenges to them, similarly, need not wait for the bulldozer.
(2) Along the way the Court finessed the reason NFMA required
unsuitability and optimality determinations to be made at the beginning of the
planning process, in the development of the plans. If they were not made at this point,
and made correctly, these areas would be put at increasing risk. Congress knew this,
hence the timing of the requirement. Apparently, the Court knew better.
(3) It also ignored the most practical fact that plan approval generates its
own momentum both within industry and the ranger district. The parties are now
good-to-go with meetings, surveying, mapping, site analysis, harvest estimates,
pricing, scheduling, all of these done with the expectation, indeed the confidence,
197. Id. at 162. Murchison’s description of the ripeness doctrine and its virtual incoherence in practice
are echoed by leading scholars and judges in Administrative Law cited throughout his article.
198. Id. at 733-734. The use of “legal harm” as a ripeness test in Ohio Forestry has been challenged
in Kristin N. Reyna, Ohio Forestry Association v. Sierra Club: The Supreme Court Reexamines
Ripeness in the Context of Judicial Review of Agency Action, 12 TUL. ENVT’L L.J. 249, 260
(1998) (arguing that requiring legal “sanctions” was inconsistent with the actual holdings of
Abbot Labs and other cases the Ohio Forestry Court relied on, id. at 261, and that since their time
both reviewing courts and scholars had since expanded the concept considerably, starting with,
see LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 395, 398 (1965)). While
accepting this expansion in theory the Court apparently overlooked the reason behind it: greater
accountability for government conduct. See discussion supra notes, at 103.
199. Ohio Forestry Ass’n, Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 734 (1998).
200. Id. at 735; Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 879 (1990).
201. Id. at 734.
202. See 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i); See also 36 C.F.R. § 219.10(e) (2016).
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that they will lead to a sale. Why else do them? As one forest plan challenger has
noted:
[T]he agency has . . . spent hundreds of millions of dollars and
countless employee hours on this planning effort. Planning
participants, Forest Service employees, and taxpayers alike must
be quite chagrined to learn that . . . the Forest Service views forest
plans as having an ‘extremely conjectural’ influence over
subsequent management activities. 203
On the basis of human nature alone it would be more than simply difficult for anyone
to then pull the plug because of a process defect months, if not years before. It would
not happen.
(4) The Court’s suggested option, further, of challenging a particular sale at
the end of the process and raising within it defects in the plan, was a chimera, and
the Service told it so. In any such appeal the question will be conformity with either
the plan or the specifics of Section 6 (g)(3). 204 The Service had already said this in
other litigation, arguing in that at sale-time its planning decisions were beyond
judicial review. 205 The Solicitor General said the same in Ohio Forestry: “It’s hard
to imagine,” he told the Justices, “a site-specific activity that would present a suitable
vehicle for the court to review the whole plan.” 206 Indeed, he continued, even if a
court were to open the plan itself at this late point to examine a suitability
determination for a single tract, its ruling would not necessarily implicate other sales,
or parties, at all. 207 When it came to challenging the contents of a plan, one was
always too early until it was too late. Unless Forest Plans were entirely above the
law, the “practical” harm for ripeness was now.
(5) The Court’s reliance on Lujan to support this approach was likewise
misplaced. That case involved standing to challenge to more than 1,200 federal
actions on 450 million acres of public lands, in eleven western states, under several
statutes and regulations. 208 There was no plan, nor a formal program. The actions in
Lujan were ripe, they were specific and happening; the question was whether the
plaintiffs had proven injury. In Ohio Forestry there was but a single forest, a single
law, and a single plan, derived in full APA formality, controlling, final until
amended, and with but two legal issues. The Court’s rejection was not based on
standing at all.

203. See Kelly Murphy, Cutting Through the Forest of the Standing Doctrine: Challenging Resource
Management Plans in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, 18 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 223, 254
(1996) (citing a reply brief in Resources Ltd. v. Robertson, 8 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.1994)).
204. See Paul A. Garrahan, Failing to See the Forest for the Trees: Standing to Challenge National
Forest Management Plans, 16 VA. ENV’T L.J. 145, 191(“[A] court would treat the plan at [the
site specific level] as a fait accompli . . . “).
205. See Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508, 1516 n.17 (9th Cir 1992) (in this case
a ripeness defense was rejected).
206. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13-14, Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998)
(No. 97-16), 1998 WL 96282 at *13.
207. Id. at 12 (if a challenge to a particular project successfully impugns the plan, then that would be
“preclusive in subsequent litigation between the same parties” (emphasis added).
208. See Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 879 (1990).
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(6) The Court’s reliance on the absence of a citizen suit provision to buttress
its decision is a yet weaker reed. For one, this absence would invalidate challenges
to individual projects as well. It also ignored the APA’s grant of review in all cases
except where “precluded by statute,” or under statutes so vague as to provide no “law
to apply.” 209 Neither applies here. NFMA’s requirements are not wishful thinking.
They are as specific as Congress could write without banning clearcutting and like
practices altogether, which it abandoned only because of the requirements for forest
plans.
(7) The Court’s suggestion that environmental impact review would
provide relief is weaker still. In drafting NFMA, Congress (unwisely) left the timing
of an EIS to the Service’s discretion, which the Service has relied on to avoid review
of its forest plans as well. 210 In addition, through other rulings the Court had
eliminated any substantive requirement from NEPA, reducing it to process; even if
an impact statement were done on a plan it could impose no limits nor change in
behavior. 211 NFMA of course could, and was intended to, or else virtually the same
Congress would not have bothered to enact it.
(8) The Court’s failure to appreciate, finally, that neither the Sierra Club nor
any other non-profit organization had the wherewithal to challenge every
questionable sale and then appeal it through the court system is simply not of this
world. Again, this was not a matter of “ease” or “convenience”—it was simply not
possible.
The Court’s treatment of the second ripeness factor, hindering agency
decision making, is similarly dubious. An agency needed the flexibility to adjust, it
reasoned, to “correct its own mistakes and apply its expertise.” 212 In this case there
is no reason to expect that the Service would “correct” its approach without public
pressure. It hadn’t corrected these policies from the day it birthed them, 213 and the
prospects it would going forward under any Administration were slim. Prior to this
litigation the agency was under the supervision of the former general counsel of a
large timber corporation that depended on clearcutting federal lands and who
complained openly about NFMA limitations, and this pattern has since continued. 214
Lastly, with plan decisions postponed to the time of timber sales corrections of any

209. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a); see also Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 411, 91
S. Ct. 814, 28 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1971), abr. by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S. Ct. 980, 51
L. Ed. 2d 192 (1977).
210. National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, § 6(g)(1), 90 Stat. 2949 (1976).
211. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizen’s Council, 490 U.S. 332 (agency can kill all the deer).
212. Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 735 (1998) (quoting F.T.C. v. Standard Oil
Co., 449 U.S. 232 (1980)).
213. See discussion at supra notes 63-67.
214. See Nomination of John Crowell to be Assistant Secretary of Agriculture, LEAGUE OF
CONSERVATION VOTERS: NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SCORECARD, https://scorecard.lcv.org
/roll-call-vote/1981-120-nomination-john-crowell-be-assistant-secretary-agriculture
(The
Assistant Secretary, former General Counsel to Louisiana Pacific, now with jurisdiction Forest
Service resource management and environmental protection had led efforts to “thwart measures
to protect federal forests” such as “limits on the size of clearcuts,” and the use of “buffer zones
along streams.” He was also found to be significantly involved in unlawful price-fixing for his
corporation’s subsidiary in Alaska. A few years later he was succeeded by Mark Rey, former
Vice President and chief lobbyist of the American Pulp and Paper Association).
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significance would require more rulemaking, which is in the interest of no one
involved.
An unasked question at the bottom of this hindering-the-agency inquiry was
whether plan challenges could not in fact assist the Service in making corrections
before they were set in stone. To which one might wonder: what else would?
The third ripeness factor, possible benefit from “further information” is
simply treated as a given. 215 Quite erroneously, as well. At issue here were the
Services policies for key determinations that had long been set in stone, and had been
raised and litigated in a specific context below, twice. If the Supreme Court wanted
yet more information, it could be obtained in short order via a one-paragraph remand.
There was no further information to be found.
In all, the Court’s opinion may be one of the most intellectually unsatisfying
it has rendered in recent years. Virtually nothing supported its ripeness analysis.
Offering several rationales for a decision is often a sign that no single one is
convincing, and here the Court offered no fewer than eight, each weaker than the one
before. The issues in the case were a horizon away from abstract disagreements over
administrative policies; they had a strong factual base and the on-the-ground
consequences of a final agency action. As for “interference,” it seems clear that
courts would benefit more from resolving these issues now than by postponing them
until further commitments had been made to implement them, rendering fair
adjudication that much less possible. Indeed, ripeness seems to have been an exit of
convenience, for reasons that may be better explained by Smokey Bear than anything
else that comes to mind. 216
5. Fallout
One is struck by the fact that the opinion was unanimous, particularly
considering the incredulity members of the Court expressed during oral argument
over the position the government was taking. That, per the Solicitor General, review
of a NFMA forest plan would “never” be appropriate . . . really? 217 And that, in the
same colloquy, if plaintiffs, “had to do what you claim they should do [pursue
separate appeals on individual sales] they’re going to have to file something like 40
lawsuits and that would not conserve judicial resources.” 218 Excellent questions, for
which the government had no useful response. The justices plainly saw the problem
they were creating, a de facto immunity for forest planning, but then created it
anyway. In so doing they removed the most important decisions of a major public
agency from judicial review.
One is also struck by the Court’s refusal to cite, or even allude to, the
substantial body of judicial precedent on this issue, which saw circuit courts divided
215. Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 736 (1998).
216. Why the Court would exempt forest plans on these grounds and not those of other agencies is
open to speculation, but it but it could relate to the high regard the Service has enjoyed since the
days of Gifford Pinchot and the success of its image, men in green whom we can trust. See text
supra at notes 26-28.
217. See Oral Argument, supra note 206 at 14 (“Question [from the Court]: Do you concede that there
has to be some mechanism for reviewing the whole plan? [Answer]: No.”); See also colloquy,
supra at notes 113-114.
218. See Oral Argument, supra note 206 at 12.
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but the more persuasive of them of based on the language, history, and purposes of
the Act. 219 The Court’s further dicta on when a plan might just be reviewable has led
to uncertainty of its own, and to yet more unbalanced results. 220 By its reasoning, if
a forest plan provides protections from logging they can be challenged at once, 221
but if it opens areas to logging, no matter how large, how sensitive, how faultily
determined, and how irrevocable in practice, effective challenges to this decision
would never come. 222 Something is wrong with this picture.
At day’s end, the Supreme Court had returned the Forest Service to the days
of discretion that had prompted the enactment of NFMA in the first place. A statute
designed to shore up the weakness of “multiple use” management wound up
succumbing to it instead. The opinion was greeted by a chorus of jeers in academia
and beyond, but of course to little avail. 223 In practice, Forest management plans still
prioritize clear-cutting and other “even age” practices, and environmentalists
struggle to redress, piece by piece, the decisions that govern them. 224 It is hardly an
efficient process, but the Service evidently prefers multiple firefights over specific
timber sales to fewer that challenge what matters. It is not the only federal agency to
do so, and with the identical consequences: more paperwork but very few changes
in behavior. 225 This approach is neither effective, consistent with NFMA, nor fair to
the public affected by it. Then again, neither was the decision in Ohio Forestry. This
case was ripe for review. 226

219. Compare Idaho Conservation League v. Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508 (9th Cir 1992), with Sierra Club
v. Marita, 46 F.3d 606 (7th Cir. 1995), and of course the case at hand (6th Cir. 1997), and Sierra
Club v. Robertson, 28 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1994); Wilderness Society v. Alcock, 83 F.3d 386 (11th
Cir. 1996). See also Cheever, supra note 137.
220. See Trent Baker, Judicial Enforcement of Forest Plans in the Wake of Ohio Forestry, 21 PUB.
LAND & RES. L. REV. 81, at 91-105 (2000) (discussing subsequent district and circuit court cases).
221. Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt, 529 U.S. 728, 9 (2000).
222. See Mumma, 956 F.2d 1508 at 1516, and Marita, 46 F.3d 606 at 614; see also Eacata Desire
Gregory, No Time is the Right Time: The Supreme Court’s Use of Ripeness to Block Judicial
Review of Forest Plans for Environmental Plaintiffs in Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 75
CHI-KENT L. REV. 613 (2000). Many of these are cited in the article, and some mince no words.
223. Many of these articles are cited in this piece, and some mince no words.
224. See Mathew Shaffer, A Review of Appeals and Litigation Over Timber Sales Between 1999 and
2008 on the Lolo National Forest, U. MONT., 2009, at ii (27% of the 157 timber sales were
appealed or litigated, representing 55% of the timber volume involved); See also Complaint for
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, WildEarth Guardians, et al. v. Weber, on file with author,
(regarding logging on the Flathead National Forest); Enviros would halt Tongass timber sales,
44 Pub. Lands News 12 (May 17, 2019).
225. The Federal Highway Administration, similarly, has successfully argued that Regional
Development Plans funded by the agency selecting transit needs, modes, and corridors (right
down to street crossings and transit stops) are premature for environmental impact review,
deferring it to later approval of individual projects. See Atlanta Coalition v. Atlanta Regional
Commission, 599 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1979). Not surprisingly both the Forest Service and the
Federal Highway Administration have topped the charts for federal EIS’s for decades; See EPA,
EISS BY YEAR FOR SELECTED AGENCIES, 1992-1996, (EPA Office of Federal Activities, 1996),
on file with author (2014 rankings were similar but are no longer on the EPA website). These are
self-inflicted wounds. Both agencies apparently prefer this burden, however, to that of opening
their most meaningful decisions to environmental review.
226. The Wayne Forest litigation arose in the context of resurging public concern over clearcutting,
similar to that which had inspired NFMA. As one law review article noted, “By the late 1980’s,
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RAPANOS: WASTING WETLANDS
“Even setting aside the plurality’s dramatic departure from our
reasoning and holding in Riverside Bayview, it’s creative opinion [in
the case at hand] is utterly unpersuasive. The plurality imposes two
novel conditions on the exercise of the Corp’s jurisdiction that can
only muddy the jurisdictional waters.”
—Justice Stevens, dissenting in Rapanos v. the United States 227
1. Prologue
The “creative” opinion that Justice Stevens alludes to above muddied the
waters badly, and they remain muddied to this day. This is mainly due to the
idiosyncrasies of the plurality opinion’s author, Justice Antonin Scalia, and his
approach to the case.
Justice Scalia had a penchant for men who openly flouted environmental
laws, even when committing crimes in the process. He made them heroes. One of his
favorites was a man named David Lucas, a real estate developer sitting on twomillion-dollar beach front properties in South Carolina. The properties were so
vulnerable to storms that the state required new buildings to be set back behind the
high storm line. 228 Lucas, well aware of these risks, sued the state for taking his
property. Justice Scalia portrayed him as an unfortunate victim of an over-reaching
government standing up against tyranny for all Americans, which was how Lucas
portrayed himself in his book, LUCAS AND THE GREEN MACHINE. 229 It was about

the Forest Service was driving on its rims, battered and lackluster. Trust in the agency’s
leadership had all but dissolved.” Frederico Cheever, The Road to Recovery: A New Way of
Thinking About the Endangered Species Act, 23 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 21-23 (1996). After the
Regional Supervisor announced that the Wayne plan would be revised “to bring its vegetation
management projections into conformity with what has happened on the ground,” followed by a
more forthright directive from the Chief himself “to limit clearcutting,” and a yet more specific
string of legislative appropriations riders restricted the practice to 25 percent of previous levels.
Respondent’s Brief, supra note 171, at 14. The promised revised plan, however, adopted in 2006,
was largely the same meal warmed over. Of the Wayne Forest’s 238 thousand acres of woodlands
more than two-thirds were declared suitable for timbering, for which clearcutting was
overwhelmingly the instrument of choice; alternative methods that left more trees standing, it
explained, would produce less in board feet and pulp. UNITED STATES FOREST SERVICE, WAYNE
NATIONAL FOREST LAND AND RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PLAN (2006) at 36 (rationale for
clearcutting) and Appendix B at B-1 (harvest data). Forest road building was to increase as well,
up to 180 miles in the next decade, in an already heavily-roaded forest. While the plan offered
numerical data on revenues and benefits, it offered no information on costs, nor were any areas
identified as “unsuitable” because of costs. Doubtless, below-cost sales remained the order of the
day. There are recent signs of change, however, the 2018 plan offers limited timber sales
converting “softwood plantations” to an original hardwood canopy. WAYNE STATE FOREST PLAN
2018, (last visited Aug. 11, 2021), https://www.fs.fed.us/sopa/components/reports/sopa-1109142019-04.html. If this policy holds, then for this one small forest in a landscape of “even age
management,” Senator Humphrey’s optimism over NFMA may at last find a home.
227. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 800 (Stevens J. dissenting, 2006).
228. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
229. DAVID LUCAS, LUCAS VS. THE GREEN MACHINE (1995).
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more than money. It was about, in Lucas’ words, “the ancient struggle to secure
property rights for all men.” 230
David Lucas was piker, however, in comparison to John Rapanos who
would defy administrative orders, court orders, and criminal conviction. Justice
Scalia, writing for a four-member plurality, elided over all of Rapanos’ behaviors in
a single, brief paragraph:
In April 1989, petitioner John A. Rapanos backfilled wetlands on
a parcel of land in Michigan that he owned and sought to develop.
This parcel included 54 acres of land with sometimes-saturated
soil conditions. The nearest body of navigable water was 11 to 20
miles away. 339 F.3d 447, 449 (CA6 2003) (Rapanos I).
Regulators had informed Mr. Rapanos that his saturated fields
were “waters of the United States,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), that could
not be filled without a permit. Twelve years of criminal and civil
litigation ensued. 231
That is all Scalia saw, or at least was willing to describe. Big government
was squashing the American Dream again and Rapanos was its latest victim.
Fortunately, as several other opinions would point out, there was much more to the
story. If Rapanos was victimized it was by his own insistence that he was above the
law. Far from bullying Rapanos, the government had been cutting him slack for
nearly a decade in hopes of bringing him around.
2. Meet Mr. Rapanos
John Rapanos was a businessman and landowner in eastern Michigan. In
1988 he purchased an option agreement with a shopping mall developer for a heavily
forested property that he intended to clear beforehand to increase its value. 232
Rapanos and his attorney submitted a development plan to the Michigan Department
of Natural Resources (DNR), which told him that the land held wetlands and that a
permit was required to proceed. 233 A few months later DNR officials toured the site
to verify the wetlands and discovered that Rapanos had already begun “scalping” the
vegetation with bulldozers and other heavy equipment. 234 Despite this provocation,
however, they simply advised him to get the wetlands mapped so he could apply for
a permit to fill them in.
He then hired a wetlands consultant, Dr. Glenn Goff, to prepare the wetland
delineation. Unfortunately for John Rapanos, Dr. Goff took his obligation seriously
and spent weeks gathering information and preparing a report showing that the site
contained approximately 50 acres under federal jurisdiction. 235 Rapanos exploded.
He refused to pay and threatened to “destroy” Dr. Goff unless he eradicated all traces

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 160.
547 U.S. at 720–21.
Id. at 729.
United States v. Rapanos, 115 F.3d. 367, 368 (6th Cir. 1997).
Id.
Id.
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of the report. 236 In the meantime, he went forward with his land clearing full bore. 237
Justice Scalia’s hero was presenting him with what in the trade are called “bad facts.”
They would only get worse.
Over the summer, after witnessing further wetland destruction on the site,
the DNR issued a cease-and-desist order. Rapanos ignored it, later explaining that he
would not commit “Nazi atrocities” if the government told him to. 238 Rapanos later
paid for a billboard suggesting the regulators were Nazi’s themselves. 239 In August,
five DNR officials met Rapanos at his boundary to determine the extent of the
damage and were refused entry. 240 A week later they attempted to meet with him at
his corporate headquarters, but were denied entry again. 241 Finally, in November they
executed a search warrant and estimated that Rapanos had expended $350,000 in
unsanctioned land-clearing and draining the site. Little forest and few wetlands
remained. 242 He had also spent over half a million dollars to fill in another 32 acres
of wetlands on two other properties. 243
In February 1993, Midland County Circuit Judge Thomas Beale ruled that
Rapanos had violated county zoning ordinances more than 1,200 times and owed
$330,000 in fines. 244 Heroic to end, Rapanos responded by calling the Circuit Court
chambers with threats to spread false allegations that Judge Beal was involved in
drug trafficking and money laundering if the fines were not rescinded. 245 He even
took out billboards again, this time criticizing Judge Beale. 246
Meanwhile, in 1991 the state had asked the federal Environmental
Protection Agency to intervene and require Rapanos to comply. 247 The facts
established at trial that, inter alia, both Rapanos and his attorney had lied about their
response to the cease-and-desist order. 248 Rapanos was charged with violating the
Clean Water Act for discharging dredge and fill without a permit, giving rise to the
case at hand.
3. Section 404 and Wetlands: A Question of Jurisdiction
In 1972, after nearly three decades of failing state efforts at water pollution
control, Congress enacted a law that placed it, instead, in the hands of a single federal

236. 547 U.S. at 763 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
237. 115 F.3d at 369.
238. Felicity Barringer, Michigan Landowner Who Filled Wetlands Faces Prison, N.Y. TIMES, May
18, 2004.
239. Hugh McDiamid, Jr., Case Pits Your Property Rights vs. Environment, DETROIT FREE PRESS,
Feb. 17, 2006 at A.1.
240. Rapanos, 115 F.3d. at 369.
241. A. J. Evenson, Saginaw – Man Avoids Prison, LANSING STATE JOURNAL, June 6, 1995.
242. Id.; Salzburg Road Site (photograph), on file with author.
243. Id.
244. Clark Hughes, John A. Rapanos who vowed “Fight to the Death” against EPA, Dies at 80, MLIVE
(posted Feb. 11, 2016, and updated Jan. 29, 2019).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d. 447 (6th Cir. 2003).
248. John Clemens, Water-Sharing Compact Dissolves, 23 WATER LOG at 10, 2003.
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agency, the newly minted Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 249 The Clean
Water Act (CWA) sought to eliminate water pollution by a date certain, and its
primary mechanism was to be increasingly rigorous discharge permits. 250
Congress also recognized that dredging and filling was a serious water
pollution problem, but could not agree on the appropriate agency to regulate it. 251 To
Senate sponsors of the CWA, EPA was the logical choice because it was uniquely
charged with carrying out and enforcing provisions of the Act. 252 There was,
however, another candidate agency. For 150 years the Army Corps of Engineers had
exercised exclusive jurisdiction over all activities in navigable waters. 253 Southern
representatives in the House, who benefitted greatly from Corps dams, levees and
navigation canals that sent money back home, saw EPA control over this activity as
a real and present danger. 254
After over a year of negotiating, Congress split the baby. Section 404 of the
CWA prescribed an elaborate pas de deux in which the Corps would issue dredge
and fill permits, 255 but under regulations promulgated by the EPA, 256 and with
provision for an EPA veto for activities it found to be unreasonably damaging. 257
This was of course a recipe for conflict between an old and venerable agency
dedicated by statute to dredging and filling on a grand scale, and a new and untried
agency dedicated to cleaning up pollution. Little wonder then that conflict followed,
and it first concerned a very basic question: the extent of the waters covered by this
new law.
To the Corps, from the outset and years beyond, the fewer waters the better.
It meant less attention to the unpleasant task of issuing dredge and fill permits and
less interference with its own programs. The EPA wanted the maximum waters
possible to fall under the CWA; this was the best way to eliminate pollution. Each
agency had “law” on its side. The CWA referred to “navigable waters” 258 which had
a traditional meaning (score one for the Corps), but the legislative history made clear
that “navigable” was to be interpreted in a new way, one that embraced all waters
within the reach of the Constitution (score one for the EPA). 259
The case for including all waters to the fullest extent possible, however
small, however far upstream, was quite strong. The bogs, seeps, sloughs, intermittent
creeks, marshes, bottomlands, wet meadows, potholes, and playa lakes are the
primary pollution prevention systems of the nation’s waters and the primary
249. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d).
250. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1314(b).
251. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON PUB. WORKS, 23d Cong. 1st Sess., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: REFORM
OF THE WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 23 (Comm. Print 1973).
252. Id. (Senior Senators Baker and Muskie were prominent in this discussion, and adamant about a
strong EPA role, id.).
253. See Act of May 12, 1933, ch. 25, title II, § 36, 48 Stat. 49 (repealed 1947).
254. STAFF OF S. COMM ON PUB. WORKS, 23d Cong., supra note 251.
255. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
256. Id. at § 1344(b).
257. Id. at § 1344(c).
258. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
259. See Conference Report, S. Rep. No. 1236, 92d Cong, 2d Sess. 144 (1972) (“waters of the United
States” intended to give the term “navigable waters,” the “broadest possible Constitutional
interpretation.”).

Winter 2022

THIS LAND IS YOUR LAND

33

determinants of their water quality. When left in place, these wetlands are natural,
self-renewing, least-cost, water treatment machines, sources for water treatment,
spinoffs of man-made waste treatment plants. The value of the services natural
waters provide in terms of pollution reduction reaches the multi-billions per year. 260
A 1993 report found that the loss of fifty percent of these upstream filters would
increase treatment costs to $75 billion for one pollutant, nitrogen, alone. 261 The loss
of these systems from even remote sources has contributed to massive “dead zones”
of anoxic water in the Gulf of Mexico, Lake Erie and the Chesapeake Bay. 262
The measures proposed to redress then rely primarily on wetlands to absorb
and treat the runoff, and to curb flooding and its sediment pollution. Congress knew
all this. Water runs downstream, and protecting wetlands was a way to keep it clean.
The jurisdiction over waters issue came to a head early on in NRDC v.
Calloway. 263 Emphasizing the importance of upstream wetlands in achieving the
CWA’s ambitious water quality goals, the D.C. District Court held that Congress
intended federal permitting to the “maximum extent possible under the Commerce
Clause of the Constitution.” 264 Per NRDC v. Calloway, and the language of Congress
itself, “navigable waters” were not tied to “traditional tests of navigability.” The
Corps was to publish within 40 days regulations clearly recognizing the “full
regulatory mandate of the Water Act.” 265
The Corps complied with the order, establishing three phases for its
implementation. 266 The first covered traditional navigable waters and adjacent
wetlands; the second primary tributaries and natural lakes greater than five acres and
their adjacent wetlands; the third went further upstream to the headwaters
themselves, including streams flowing less than five cubic feet per second. This
done, the Engineers went to war.
The Corps issued a press release stating that federal permits could be
required for “a farmer wanting to plow a field,” or a mountaineer “wanting to protect
his land against stream erosion,” even a house wife throwing out the dirty
dishwater. 267 Congress took up the charge, one Representative complaining of “a
very complicated permit process” for ordinary forestry and agriculture. 268 The House
of Representatives passed a bill reverting § 404 jurisdiction to traditional navigable
waters, period, despite opponents’ arguments that this would leave “98 percent of all
stream miles and 80 percent of wetlands unprotected by federal controls.” 269 The
260. See WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, STATEWIDE WETLAND STRATEGIES, A GUIDE TO PROTECTING AND
MANAGING THE RESOURCES, at 5 (1992) (estimating functional values in sewage treatment alone
at from $1-6 billion).
261. WORLD WILDLIFE FUND, supra note 260.
262. See Oliver A Houck, Cooperative Federalism, Nutrients and the Clean Water Act: Three Cases
Revisited, ENV’T LAW. REP., May (2014) (discussing inter alia dead zones in Florida, the
Mississippi Gulf Coast and the Chesapeake Bay).
263. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 389 F. Supp. 1263 (D. Conn. 1974), rev’d in part,
524 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1975).
264. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C. 1975).
265. 40 Fed. Reg. 31,319 (1975).
266. Id.
267. See Corps Press release cited in 123 Cong. Rec. 10, 427-38 (1977) (describing Corps blowback.).
268. See 123 Cong. Rec. 10,415 (statement of Representative Kemp).
269. Id. at 1270 (statement of Representative Lehman)
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House of Representatives tried again, twice, to reject the Calloway decision, but
failed. 270
Ultimately, cooler heads in the Senate prevailed. Congress retained the
extensive jurisdiction asserted in the Calloway decision. Instead, it provided
exemptions for normal agricultural and sylvicultural practices and even a process for
delegation of the program to qualified states, 271 an offer accepted by only two states,
one subsequently withdrawing. 272 The low acceptance rate is understandable. As
anyone involved in administering these programs knows, wetland permitting is a
tough, often nasty, business. All the more surprising is that the Army Corps and EPA,
so long at war over wetland permitting, would reach an accord on the jurisdictional
reach of § 404 reflected in the regulations in this case. If an agency committed to
development is allied with one committed to environmental protection, that is a good
indication that the regulations were in balance.
One would think that at this point, after so much attention, the war over
§ 404 jurisdiction would be over . . . but one would be wrong. There was simply too
much money to be made by too many parties from dredging and filling in the waters
of the United States. And there were some individuals who would not believe in the
law, or obey it, no matter how explicitly the law was explained to them, and how
much leeway they would be given to comply. Mr. Rapanos was one of them.
4. Rapanos: The Plurality Opinion
Justice Scalia’s empathy for scoundrels was matched only by his antipathy
to environmental laws intended to restrict them. This antipathy was manifest in
Scalia’s Rapanos plurality opinion, that took a simple, clearly-stated command
(wetland permitting) and its widespread acceptance by all parties affected, and
inserted two “novel” limitations that badly crippled the Clean Water Act and the
achievement of its goals.
Scalia began by emphasizing the burden placed on Mr. Rapanos, permit
delays averaging 788 days and costing up to $271,000 per permit, plus the costs of
mitigation . . . as if the destruction of wetland values should be free. 273 As any
significant builder knows, even at the local level permits are slow and expensive,
particularly if, as in this case, fiercely contested by permitting agencies. In this
process, the Corps as permitting agency was acting as an “enlightened despot,”
apparently out of control. 274 Justice Scalia’s emotional fidelity to Mr. Rapanos could
not be more apparent.

270. Id. (statement of Representative Edgar).
271. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f) (agriculture and sylvaculture); § 1344(g) (state assumption).
272. See Forty Years After the Clean Water Act: Is it Time for the States to implement Section 404
Permitting?: Hearing before the Subcomm. On Water Res. And Env’t of H. Comm. on Transp.
and Infrastructure, 112th Cong. 106 (2012) (The two states accepting jurisdiction were Michigan
and New Jersey. A few years later Michigan dropped out).
273. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 721, 721.
274. Id.
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Equally apparent was Scalia’s description of the waters at issue, which were
“swampy lands” 275 and endless stretches of “ephemeral waters” in “mudflats and dry
arroyos.” In Scalia’s view, they were not waters at all. 276
His view of the connections of these waters to navigable waters was equally
skeptical; many were also “ephemeral,” “impermanent,” not aquatic connections at
all. 277 These conclusions led Justice Scalia to invent two legal requirements for
wetlands protected by Section 404. One, the wetland itself had to be permanent. 278
Second: the connection to a navigable body of water had to be permanent as well. 279
Without both present, there was no Federal jurisdiction at all. Mr. Rapanos was free
to destroy any wetland he wanted, however valuable. Justice Scalia, allegedly a strict
constructionist, was legislating here, making it up as he went along. 280
Several other aspects of the remarkable plurality opinion bear mention. The
first was that Mr. Rapanos could have avoided this conflict altogether simply by
providing mitigation, requested by federal and state agencies to replace the loss of
public values, a commonly-accepted practice across a range of environmental
programs. 281 He would get his permit at a bargain rate (mitigation rarely covers all
environmental losses), allowing him to go forward on the cheap. 282 This was John
Rapanos’ easy way out.
The second was the absolute absence of any reference to wetland values
that had prompted Congress to pass this special provision of the CWA. Among them
were flood protection, water quality protection, and fish and wildlife values. 283 Nor
did the plurality opinion say a word, not even a recognition that these values would
be largely destroyed by dredge and fill upstream. Rather, anomalously, Justice Scalia
opined, that the impacts were basically “local.” 284 Any high school student in a
science class could rebut him on this point, rather soundly.

275. Id. at 722 (“including half of Alaska and an area the size of California in the lower 48 States. And
that was just the beginning.”).
276. Id. at 724, 733.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 739.
279. Id.
280. The Rapanos case also included a co-petitioner referred to as “the Carabells.” Id. at 727. The
facts and law treated in the Carabells petition were highly similar to those in Rapanos, to the
point the Court’s discussion of their petition was highly truncated, and supported by the same,
inventive reasoning of Justice Scalia in Rapanos itself. Indeed, the name Rapanos is the only one
that appears in the official print of the case.
281. See Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and the Environmental
Protection Agency, “Determination of Mitigation under the Clean Water Act § 404(b)(1)
Guidelines,” (1990), https://www.epa.gov/cwa-404/memorandum-agreemement-regardingmitigation-under-cwa-section-404b1-guidelines-text.
282. See Oliver A. Houck, Land Loss in Coastal Louisiana: Causes, Consequences and Remedies, 58
TUL. L. REV. 3, 135 (1983).
283. See Oliver A. Houck and Michael Rolland, “Federalism in the Wetlands: A Consideration of
Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and Related Programs to the States,” 54 MD. L. REV.
1242, 1244-1253 (2012) (describing and quantifying wetland values in flood protection, water
quality, fish and wildlife, and recreation).
284. 547 U.S. at 744, 745 (dredge and fill does not “normally wash downstream”).
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A third is that neither of the two previous Court cases cited by the plurality
in support of these conclusions supported them at all. Riverside Bayview Homes 285
actually stretched Corps jurisdiction to include waters where connection to navigable
waters had been totally blocked by a berm. The SWANCC decision dealt with waters
that were in themselves wetlands, but rejected regulations finding them “navigable”
based on the presence of migratory birds. 286 Neither citation would survive a suband-cite scrubbing by a responsible law journal.
A fourth anomaly was the plurality’s wistful fealty to the old Corps
“navigability” definition that excluded most wetlands in America. 287
Acknowledging, as federal courts had since Calloway, that Congress intended wider
jurisdiction, the plurality opinion seemed intent on limiting this expansion, hence its
addition of two new tests.
A fifth was Justice Scalia’s allusion to state law as the appropriate venue
for making such “land use” decisions as those in Rapanos. 288 Of course, however,
Section 404 permitting was a “water” use decision and no more an intrusion on
state’s rights than were federal air quality or hazardous waste facility permitting. 289
Each had large “land use” consequences, and each imposed a kind of zoning. On this
issue Justice Scalia’s law clerks let him down, or he ignored them.
A final, noteworthy aspect of this opinion is its disregard for its own
cardinal rules for statutory interpretation and regulatory changes. Under Chevron, 290
an agency seeking to change its interpretation of law had the burden of showing its
new policy was justified, with adequate reasons. Justice Scalia himself changed the
Section 404 regulations, with no more allusion to Chevron than that the flippant
statement that the new policy was “impermissible” as written. 291 No reasons for
disregarding Chevron were offered, beyond a “burden” on developers and the scope
of the jurisdiction claimed. For its part, the APA 292 required a full notice-andcomment process for the promulgation of all federal regulatory actions . . . which
was circumvented here because Scalia promulgated the new regulations himself.
Rather convenient.
In sum, all of this is to say that Justice Scalia’s opinion for himself and three
other Justices was a shoddy affair. It was replete with factual inaccuracies,
exaggerations, misuse of precedent, and reliance on argument that cut exactly the
other way. 293 The great anomaly of the case is that five Justices of the High Court
had exactly the same views regarding Justice Scalia’s opinion, and expressed them
openly.
So how did the plurality prevail?
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United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
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Id. at 737.
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Sensing perhaps that Scalia’s opinion was threadbare, Chief Justice
Roberts, one of the four-member plurality, also wrote separately to point out that,
following Riverside Bayview Homes and SWANCC, the Corps and EPA had an
opportunity to revise its § 404 regulations, and did not do so. This was a cheap shot
at the agencies. Given the fact that Riverside cut in favor of the regulations and that
SWANCC was limited to a fact pattern that had nothing to do with Rapanos, there
was no reason for the agencies to change the status quo.
Roberts’ opinion was also a cheap shot because, in Justice Kennedy’s
opinion it: “neglect[ed] to mention . . . that almost all of the 43 states to submit
comments opposed any narrowing of the Corps’ jurisdiction – as did roughly 99%
of the . . . other comment submitters.” 294
So much for federalism. The republican plurality was ruling against the
states.
5. Rapanos: The Concurring Opinion
The most surprising aspect of Justice Kennedy’s concurrence is that he
agrees with the four dissenters on every point of fact and law. He called out Justice
Scalia’s plurality opinion for imposing new and innovative limits on § 404 without
supporting facts or convincing reasons. 295 He rejected Justice Scalia’s use of
Riverside and SWANCC when the first undercut his own opinion and the second dealt
with a different issue inapposite to Rapanos. 296
Kennedy went on to chide the plurality for asserting that the impacts of
dredge and fill were local, when in fact changes in Minnesota were felt as far
downstream as the Gulf of Mexico . . . where the impacts have caused considerable
damage. 297 He further deplored the misuse of Chevron, and the failure to provide
adequate reasoning for changing the regulation interpretation under the APA. 298
Had he stopped here—and he should have—he would have made the fifth
vote to uphold the regulations in Rapanos. His vote would have affirmed the
conviction of John Rapanos for his crimes. But he didn’t. Instead, playing a role he
developed on the Court as a compromising mediator, and perhaps unwilling to
directly antagonize his Republican colleagues on the bench (Supreme Court
environmental cases are almost always Republican v. Democrat), 299 he developed a
new test for the reach of § 404 jurisdiction: Significant Nexus. 300 Wetlands would
have to have a “significant nexus” to a navigable water in order to be within § 404
jurisdiction. 301

294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

547 U.S. 715, 777 (Justice Kennedy, Concurring).
547 U.S. at 768.
Id. at 767.
Id. at 765 (“increased risk of erosion and degradation”).
Id. at 766.
See Oliver A. Houck, Arbitrary and Capricious: The Dark Canon of the United States Supreme
Court in Environmental Law, 33 GEORGETOWN ENV. L.J. 1 at n. 92 (describing the nearunanimous rejection of environmental cases by Republican members of the Court).
300. 547 U.S. at 784.
301. Id.
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Sensing perhaps that his test solved nothing because the significance would
be up to the beholder, he turned to the Corps to develop new regulations that would
point the way. These new regulations, duly promulgated under Justice Kennedy’s
directive and tracking closely his critique of the plurality opinion, would become
final, and then, under the Trump administration, the Corps’ first choice of regulations
to be undone. Once again wetland jurisdiction would go back to the test advocated
by Justice Scalia: navigability. And of course this, too, would go to court.
6. Rapanos: The Dissents
Writing for three colleagues, (as had Justice Scalia), Justice Stevens
concurred in all the criticisms of the plurality opinion identified by Justice Kennedy.
More than Kennedy, he deplored the regulations that had been upheld by the courts
for decades. 302 He disagreed, however, with Kennedy’s surprise offer of a new
“significant nexus” test for Section 404 jurisdiction. The test was far too soft, and far
too flexible, to provide clear guidance to the agencies. It would create “additional
work” for the agencies, while developers “wishing to fill wetlands adjacent to
ephemeral or intermittent” tributaries of navigable waters will have “no way of
knowing” whether they need to get § 404 permits or not. 303 Justice Kennedy meant
well with his “significant nexus,” test but he had created a mess going forward.
Justice Breyer, signing onto the Stevens opinion, had one additional point
to offer. His test for Section 404 jurisdiction was elegantly simple. Reject the
plurality as too narrow. Reject Kennedy’s concurrence as too soft. And strengthen
Stevens’ dissent with a single addition. The administrative powers of the Corps of
Engineers should remain “untouched” by any of the opinions. 304 The agency could
“write regulations” defining the term, something “it had not yet done.” 305 Congress
intended that for the “complex technical judgements that lie at the heart of the present
cases,” the Corps of Engineers “should receive full deference.” 306 Which Justice
Scalia, of course, did not provide.
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7. In the Wake of Rapanos: Chaos
“Much ink has been spilled by lower courts attempting to interpret
the 4-1-4 Rapanos decision.”
—Wade Foster, “Parsing Rapanos” 307
The Supreme Court could not have created more confusion over the extent
of § 404 jurisdiction had that been its intention all along. Splits, and subsets of splits,
soon developed at the district and appellate court levels over what the case meant,
what test would be used, and how this test would be applied. As could have been
anticipated, the Rapanos result was a muddle.
The first court to consider the question determined that the case provided
no “clear direction or binding precedent.” 308 Another district court judge asked to
apply Rapanos requested that the matter be sent to another colleague because he was
“so perplexed by the way the law” had been interpreted since the High Court’s
opinion. 309 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the Rapanos opinion “has
indeed satisfied any ‘bafflement’ requirement.” 310 In sum, wherever Rapanos raised
its head, chaos reigned.
Much of the chaos arose because there was no majority opinion. Instead,
there was a four-justice plurality. Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion disagreed
with everything in the plurality opinion. This so, where did the “law of the case” lie?
Adding to the chaos, there were three different approaches in law to resolve the
question, each providing either a different result or a different reason for the result.
In Marks v. United States 311 the High Court wrote that when its opinions
were “fragmented” and no single rationale “enjoys” the agreement of five members,
the holding may be viewed that agreed to on the “narrowest grounds.” Unfortunately,
when it came to Rapanos this guidance was useless. As discussed above, Justice
Kennedy’s concurrence did not agree with the plurality on anything, neither the facts,
nor the law. As one court observed, “[F]or some issues, asking which of two opinions
is narrower is akin to asking ‘[w]hich is taller, left or right?’ 312 So it was here. All of
which put those having to deal with the issue back at square one.
The Rapanos opinion, like some malignant Rubiks Cube, left an intractable
problem in its wake. It would now be up to the Executive Branch to resolve it.
8. The Regulation Wars
The Obama Administration’s 2015 rule was one of the most detailed of any
federal environmental rule. Promulgated jointly by the EPA and the Army Corps, it
cited abundant science on the importance of upstream wetlands, however
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Wade Foster, Comment, Parsing Rapanos, VIRGINIA ENV. L.J., (2018).
Id.
United States v. Robison, 521 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1248 (N.D. Ala. 2007) (Mem).
United States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200, 208 (6th Cir. 2009).
Id.
Lisk v. Lumber One Wood Preserving, LLC, 792 F.3d 1331, 1337 (11th Cir. 2015) (another
opinion wrestling with the application of Marks).
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“ephemeral” or “unconnected” to navigable waters, to achieving the pollution
control objectives of the Clean Water Act. 313 The Federal Register notice adopting
the final rule ran seventy-five pages of three-column, small font size, describing the
rationale for the rule, the consideration of alternative rules, and the scientific support
for this particular selection. 314 Under the rule, only the smallest, most isolated waters
would be exempt from § 404 jurisdiction, with a strong burden of proof on those
claiming the exemption.
The Trump Administration’s plan that followed had a “particularly tortured
procedural history.” 315 It sought to repeal the Obama 2015 Rule first, and then
replace it. 316 When it became clear that repealing this rule would require, inter alia,
notice and comment rulemaking and a compelling rationale, the Trump
Administration tried simply to postpone the repeal’s effective date until the end of
the President’s term in office, 2020. 317 For this reason the team gave up on the repeal
idea, and the focused exclusively on a replacement rule. 318 Anomalously, by not
repealing the 2015 Rule it remained in effect in twenty-two states by court order 319
exactly what the Trump administration was trying to avoid.
9. Rapanos: Reflections
Perhaps no Supreme Court opinion in recent times has received the degree
of attention from other courts, Congress, 320 and academics 321 than Rapanos. Their
response is largely negative. Even development-oriented commentators who like
Justice Scalia’s result agree that the opinion itself is a mess. 322
The mess continues to this day. It will be up to the Congress, the Biden
Administration, or the High Court itself to come up with a clear, workable rule that
accomplishes the water pollution goals of the Clean Water Act.
In the meantime, Rapanos has turned out to be a very bad gift that just kept
on giving.

313. Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37053 (June 29,
2015).
314. Id.
315. MARK DAVIS & KRISTEN HILFERTY, WATERS OF THE UNITED STATES: COMMENTS TO THE 2019
CLEAN WATER RULE PROPOSAL 2 (2019).
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. For the critical, almost disbelieving responses of lower courts see cases cited in supra notes 309,
310, and 312.
320. See Interpreting the Rapanos/Carabell Supreme Court Decision: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Fisheries, Wildlife, and Water of the Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works, 109th Cong. (2006).
321. See Foster, supra note 307, and Davis and Hilferty, supra note 315.
322. See Reed Hopper, Running Down the Controlling Opinion in Rapanos v. United States, PACIFIC
LEGAL FOUNDATION (June 12, 2017) https://pacificlegal.org/running-controlling-opinionrapanos-v-united-states/ (Pacific Legal was the first and remains the most active businesssponsored public interest law firm in the United States); Oliver A Houck, With Charity for All,
93 YALE L.J. 1415, 1460-1473 (1984).
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MIMBRES RIVER: DO FORESTS NEED WATER?
“They thought the forests ate the water!”
—James W. Moorman, Assistant Attorney General for Natural
Resources and the Environment, 1978 323
1. The Gila Forest
The Gila National Forest has become an icon of its own in federal land
management, if for no reason other than by carrying the legacy of Aldo Leopold. In
1909, a young Leopold launched his career with the U.S. Forest Service in New
Mexico shooting wolves and cougars to mollify local ranchers. 324 He became quite
good at it. A few years later he had an epiphany, however, standing by the still-warm
body of a dying wolf and witnessing “a fierce green fire dying in her eyes.” 325 It
prompted him to develop a new approach to wildlife management in which predators
were accorded their due. 326 This led next to the conclusion that undeveloped parts of
nature deserved their due as well, 327 and he went to work to make that happen.
Aldo Leopold finally accomplished his goal. Congress enacted the
Wilderness Act in 1964. 328 He retired to a farm in Wisconsin and developed a yet
broader ethic for the diversity of all landscapes, great and small. 329 His maxim to
“save every cog and wheel is the first precaution of intelligent tinkering” 330 became
the basis for the Endangered Species Act 331 and the still-evolving concept of
biodiversity. 332 Throughout his writings and advocacy, Leopold’s intellectual growth
was remembered in many ways. Perhaps the one he appreciated the most lies in the
Gila National Forest of southern New Mexico, the landscape where he had begun his
career.
The Aldo Leopold Wilderness Area in the Gila Forest preserves over
200,000 acres of mountains, rivers, and desert that became America’s first de facto
wilderness decades before the concept was formally enacted as law. 333
The Gila also carries the legacies of the Mogollon people who left their
relics, petroglyphs, and other remains along the Mimbres River and high on cliff

323. Interview with James R. Moorman, Assistant Attorney General for Natural Resources and
Environment, U.S. Dep’t of Just., in Washington D. C. (Jan. 20, 2017).
324. See FLADER, supra note 2.
325. Aldo Leopold, Thinking Like a Mountain, 14 EPA J. 2 (1988).
326. See FLADER, supra note 2; see also ALDO LEOPOLD, GAME MANAGEMENT (1933).
327. Id.
328. 16 U.S.C. § 1131.
329. ALDO LEOPOLD, SAND COUNTY ALMANAC SKETCHES HERE AND THERE (1949).
330. Id. at 101.
331. 16 U.S.C. § 1531.
332. See EDWARD O. WILSON, THE DIVERSITY OF LIFE (1992).
333. See U.S.D.A. FS, Aldo Leopold Wilderness, https://www.fs.usda.gov/recarea/gila/recarea/
?recid=4826. See also text at note 6 supra (describing early management of the forest as
wilderness under Leopold’s initiative).
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faces that rose to 10,000 feet in the air. 334 The Gila mountain ranges cradle more than
1,000 miles of streams that are critical for aquatic life and groundwater discharge
throughout the region. 335 They feed into the Mimbres river as well, that supplies
ranchers and farmers hundreds of miles downstream.
It was for these reasons, and against these demands, that the Forest Service
would choose the Gila to establish the National Forests’ own lawful right to water.
The resulting lawsuit would eventually reach the United States Supreme Court
which, in a badly divided opinion, managed to misconstrue both the nature of water
in the forests and the applicable law.
2. Western Water and the Federal Reserved Rights Doctrine
A stark contrast in water quantity existed between the American East and
the West. Water was abundant in the East and easy to share, but across the
Mississippi, water was so scarce that sharing meant no one got enough. Eastern water
law relied on its abundance, and led to the Riparian doctrine whose basic principle
was sharing the resource. 336 Western water was scarce and gave rise to the Prior
Appropriation Doctrine based on use rather than sharing. 337 Water was owned, not
just used, divided up according to the date it was first claimed. 338 One got as much
as one needed, for as much time as was needed, even if it was needed miles from the
river itself. Indeed, the only way one lost a water right was by not using it. 339 To the
Western mind, not using was waste. As the story goes:
Two farm families in New Mexico drove miles to picnic on a river
one day . . . While the ladies were spreading the blanket and
opening the food basket the two men “sauntered over to the
riverbank, where they stood watching the sparkling river drift by.
One farmer let out a long, knowing sigh, turned to the other, and
said, ‘Isn’t it a shame to see all that water go to waste?’” 340
At the end of a treatise containing this tale the author concludes that the basic
question today is “what is waste, and what is wonder.” 341 Of course, however, Prior
Appropriation Doctrine had that already figured out. First to claim took all they could
swallow, leaving everyone else behind. There was a catch, however.

334. See National Park Service, Gila Cliff Dwellings, https://www.nps.gov/gicl/index.htm (July 9,
2021).
335. See U.S.D.A. FS, PRELIMINARY DRAFT MANAGEMENT PLAN FOR THE GILA NATIONAL Forest 5
(March 2018), https://www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/fseprd573667.pdf.
336. Christopher H. Meyer, Western Water and Wildlife: The New Frontier, in AUDUBON WILDLIFE
REPORT 1989/1990, (William J. Chandler, 1989).
337. Id. at 61. The general notion was “‘[f]irst in time is first in right.’ It meant that those who put the
water to use had priority to continue using it over those who came later.”
338. See also Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 555 (1963) (“Under that law the one who first
appropriates water and puts it to beneficial use thereby acquires a vested right to continue to
divert and use that quantity of water against all claimants junior to him in point of time.”)
339. See Meyer, supra note 336. See also BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR. ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF
WATER RESOURCES CASES AND MATERIALS 170 (West Academic Publishing, 5th ed. 2012).
340. See Meyer, supra note 336.
341. Id.
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The federal government had reserved parts of the western water domain for
specific public purposes, and in many cases those purposes could only be met by
direct access. For this reason, the Supreme Court created a competing system, the
Federal Reserved Water Doctrine, back-dating the claims for these areas to the time
when they were first established. 342 The Supreme Court announced this doctrine in
favor of Native American Reservations in Winters v. United States 343 (1908) and
Arizona v. California 344 (1963). The Court extended this doctrine to a National
Monument established to shelter the endangered Devils’ Hole pupfish in Cappaert
v. United States (1976). 345 Although there were long lines of individuals who had
lodged their water claims beforehand, they found themselves trumped by the federal
doctrine.
Needless to say, this court-made doctrine was not welcomed by states
whose absolute authority over a critical resource was subverted, or to ranches, farms,
and towns whose previous water rights could be trimmed without notice. Such would
be the case for the Gila National Forest, where the Forest Service filed its claim on
the Mimbres River in 1970, very far behind current users. 346 Under the Federal
Reserved Water Rights Doctrine, however, the Forest Service’s claim to water for
forest purposes would supersede.
The legal question in New Mexico v. United States, then, was whether the
purposes for which the Gila National Forest was created, like those of the Native
American reservations and the Cappaert National Monument, assumed the use of
water.
3. The National Forests and Water
The Forest Service’s relationship with water goes back to well before there
was a Forest Service. In 1876 Representative Fort of Illinois introduced a bill to
protect forests adjacent to navigable waters. 347 That same year Commissioner
Williamson of the US General Lands Office reported to Congress:
The mountain streams, whose steady flow is important . . . are fed by the
melting snows. The steadiness of the flow of these streams . . . is in great measure
due to the rapid melting of the winter’s accumulation is prevented by the dense shade
of the forests. This removed, destructive floods in the season of returning warmth, to
be followed later by scarcity, become the rule. 348
Several years later, the fate of the forests in the balance, Congressman
McRae concurred:
Common sense and science, I think, will agree that the forest cover
will hold both the rainfall and the melting snow, so that they will
342.
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344.
345.
346.
347.
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not rush to the streams in torrents in the spring and early summer.
We all know that in well-timbered country the water goes more
gradually into the streams and gives a steadier flow, with fewer
overflows, and less low water. 349
Following these statements, in 1894 Congress enacted legislation with the
purpose of securing favorable flows within the forests, setting up the more
comprehensive Organic Act in 1897 under which the Service had operated for more
than a century. 350 The Act stated: “No national forest shall be established, except to
improve and protect the forest within the boundaries, or for the purpose of securing
favorable conditions of water flows, and to furnish a continuous supply of timber for
the use and necessities of citizens in the United States.” 351
Several conclusions emerge from this language. The first is that the word
“or” is disjunctive: Congress separated one thing from another. The second is that
the protections mentioned in the first phrase were “within” forest boundaries, the
forest itself. Congress intended to protect the forests as natural condition, not a
bathtub. The “improve and protect” mandate came first in the statute, and became
the priority mission of the new Service. Water supply and timber came in second and
third. To omit the first mission would be to amend the statute substantially.
Another conclusion is that, when it came to “securing favorable flows,” the
most unfavorable would be no flow at all. Allowing appropriators to locate their
points of diversion upstream, or even within a forest would render the forests unable
to fulfil either their “improve and protect” mission or “a continuous supply of
timber.” That could hardly be the condition Congress had in mind.
A corollary to these conclusions is the recognition that forests do not
consume water in the traditional Prior Appropriation way. They accumulate, store,
and filter it, then release it in a way that not only sends a reliable flow downstream
but of a quality that ranchers, towns and farmers can readily use. 352 It is a win-win
for both sides. The notion that the National Forests “eat” the water has no basis in
science at all.
With these understandings, it is time to turn to the appropriation the Gila
Forest was claiming in this case, its treatment by New Mexico, and finally to its
treatment by the Supreme Court.
4. The Water Claim: A Modest Proposal
In 1970 New Mexico launched an adjudication of water rights to the
Mimbres River, during which the Forest Service claimed six cubic feet per second
for recreational uses (i.e., fishing, hiking and camping) and minimum instream
flows. 353 None of these activities consumed water. The Service also claimed
additional water for the Ranger station and roads. Aside from these latter uses—

349. Act of Oct. 1 1890, Sec 2, 26 Stat. 651; 30 CONG. REC. H13, 966 (1897) (statement of Rep.
Thomas C. McRae).
350. 16 U.S.C. § 475.
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352. See U.S. v. Jesse, 744 P.2d 491, 500-501 (Colo. 1987) (quoting McRae, supra note 357, at 966).
353. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1978).
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inevitable were one to manage a forest at all—the water of the Gila was to flow to
downstream users.
The state district court referred the matter to a Special Master, whose report
supported the Service’s claim. 354 The Special Master concluded that the amount
requested, a total of 15.7 acre feet per year, would not interfere with upstream
appropriators or downstream users. 355 By contrast, government statistics showed that
national forests were supplying more than 200 million acre feet per year to other
claimants. 356 The Gila Forest’s claim was, literally, a drop in the bucket. For New
Mexico, however, it was one drop too many. It contested the Report.
The district court did not contradict the Special Master’s report, but found
instead that the Service had no lawful claim to the water at all. 357 The instream values
and recreational uses not being within “the purposes for which the Gila forest lands
were or could have been withdrawn from the public domain.” 358 The United States
appealed to the Supreme Court of New Mexico which, again accepted the facts but
found no basis for the water claims in law. 359 Although very much part of the Gila’s
history, they were “secondary uses” and not “purposes” of the 1897 Organic Act,
which, unfortunately, was clearly an erroneous conclusion that ignored the first part
of the statute.
The remaining question was whether the U.S. Supreme Court would see the
light.
5. United States v. New Mexico 360
Justice Rehnquist came from Arizona, a yet more arid state than New
Mexico, whose ranching and agriculture industries were even more dependent on
water from the National Forests. This was the life he knew. Writing for a 5-4
majority, he concluded that the forests had no rights to water other than for supplying
these two industries. In so doing he managed to misconstrue both the relevant facts
and the law.
Justice Rehnquist had a particular tendency for cherry-picking both the facts
and the law in cases before him, a tendency so notable that Justice Brenan advised
his clerks to “look for the trick.” Rehnquist, he continued “often twisted the meaning
of prior cases, or badly ignored them when they supported the other side” in anything
he wrote. 361 Justice Stevens, for his part, took Rehnquist drafts home and “read over
354. Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 564 P.2d 615, 616 (N.M. 1977).
355. See New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 703-04.
356. See id. at 703; see also Brief for Petitioner at 4, United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696
(1978) (No. 77-510), 1978 WL 206869, at *4.
357. See Pet’r Br., 1978 WL 206869, at *5.
358. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2, New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (No. 77-510),1978 WL
206871, at *2.
359. See Pet’r Br., 1978 WL 206869, at *6.
360. 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
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(1979); see also id. at 405 (“Rehnquist, Brennan explained, often twisted the meaning of prior
cases, or baldly ignored them when they supported the other side.”); id. at 408 (“When [Justice]
Stevens received a copy of Rehnquist’s draft, he took it home with him and went over it carefully.
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them carefully.” Rarely, in five years on the appeals court, he said, “had he seen such
a misuse of precedents. Rehnquist ‘can’t do this’, he told the clerk the next morning.”
In this case finding the trick was not difficult at all. He began with an
assertion of fact that was plainly wrong:
When, as in the case of the Rio Mimbres, a river is fully
appropriated, federal reserved water rights will frequently require
a gallon-for-gallon reduction in the amount of water available for
water-needy state and private appropriators. This reality has not
escaped the attention of Congress, and must be weighed in
determining what, if any, water Congress reserved for use in the
national forests. 362
Where Justice Rehnquist got these statements is a mystery. As seen earlier,
forests store water, they conserve it, they do not remove gallon-per-gallons of it, they
do not reduce it at all. As for the “attention of Congress,” the assertion was likewise
misleading. The ineludible fact was that Congress could stop federal reserved water
rights any time it wished, either in a particular forest or the entire doctrine. It had
never done so. Nonetheless with these assertions, more politician than judge, he had
hung a big warning sign for downstream industries: “Beware of the Federal
Government Taking Your Water.”
Justice Rehnquist did no better with the law. Like the courts below, he
asserted that Congress had passed the Organic Act for “only two purposes.” 363
Unfortunately for the Justice, the Congress had listed three: (1) “to improve and
protect the forest,” or (2) “for favorable conditions of water flows,” and (3) to furnish
a continuous supply of timber.” 364 In Rehnquist-land, the first simply disappeared.
The Justice defended this deviation from the statute by amending it himself in a
footnote to read “improve and protect the forest within the boundaries,” or in other
words only for water supply and timber. 365 Any law student in America would pick
up on this sleight of hand.
The Justice’s “in other words” erased “improve and protect” from the
statute. By hook or by crook, he was going to affirm the two purposes he agreed
with. The time-honored principle of giving each part of statute independent meaning
went out the window. The part that he’d removed had been important to Congress.
It was also important to Forest health going forward.
Writing for four Court members in dissent, Justice Powell picked up on
Rehnquist’s distortion of the 1897 Act. 366 He began with the historic importance of
forests as natural ecosystems, the part Justice Rehnquist did not mention at all. “From
the earliest time in English law,” Powell wrote, “the forest has included the creatures
that live there” and “the understanding that the forest includes its wildlife has
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remained in the American mind.” 367 As Powell had earlier explained during oral
argument in Tennessee Valley v. Hill 368 he was a fisherman, he’d spent time in the
woods. “I do not agree . . .” he wrote:
. . . that the forests which Congress intended to “improve and
protect” are the still, silent, lifeless places envisioned by the Court.
In my view, the forests consists of the birds, animals, and fish —
the wildlife — that inhabit them, as well as the trees, shrubs, and
grasses. I therefore would hold that the United States is entitled to
so much water as is necessary to sustain the wildlife of the forests,
as well as the plants. 369
True to this vision, he would not adopt the government’s case fully. The
Forest Service’s first duty was to the natural environment which granted, did not
include recreation or other uses. It did include, however, the water necessary to
sustain the forest itself in a natural state. His was a reasonable compromise, and one
that did virtually no injury to downstream appropriators. Insofar as the majority
rejected it, Powell concluded, the “Congress is maligned and the nation is the
poorer.” 370
All in all, this was not a good day for natural resource management, nor a
proud one for the United States Supreme Court.
REFLECTIONS
There is no easy explanation for the Supreme Court’s treatment of cases
rising from federal resource management statutes. Where agencies have acted to
abuse their statutes (SUWA, Ohio Forestry) the Court has given them free rein, on
the most slender of rationales. Where, on the other hand, agencies have acted in good
faith to protect resources that Congress intended them to protect (Rapanos, New
Mexico), they have been reversed, again on rationales that simply seem confected to
fit the occasion.
One would think that the High Court Justices—who have had little personal
or professional experience with public lands resource issues—would be more
deferential to trial and appellate courts that, indeed, do have this experience. To say
nothing of decisions made by professional federal managers.
As seen in this article, however, the evidence is otherwise. The one thing
that these four cases have in common is—whether dealing with off-road vehicles,
timber harvesting, wetland protection, or water use—is that industry wins. Woody
Guthrie’s famous ode to the public landscape of America, “This Land is Your Land,
This Land is My Land” seems, in some quarters, to be increasingly naïve.
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